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During the early 1990s a trend of aggregating policy variables emerged out of 
econometric examinations of growth in transition countries, where more conventional 
growth models proved inadequate or incomplete. This thesis examines the use of one 
aggregation in particular, the cumulative liberalization index (CLI) representing 
structural reforms, and how different constructions of the index based on its conceptual 
structure can lead to different results. Further, the implications of different conceptual 
structures can lead to far different conclusions in applications of policy. This analysis 
shows, that although the different aggregations have similar capacities to predict 
growth, there are important differences in how the results are interpreted and applied. 
Namely, different conclusions about the effect of liberalization policy can be formed or 
obscured based on the outcomes of economic models that use different aggregations of 
policy indicators. A direct line can be drawn from the concept structuring through to the 
results and interpretation. Additionally, a conceptually simplified model based on the 
substantive results of the analysis is proposed that eliminates the need for a structural 
reforms construct entirely. 
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The use of data and models to support policy decisions is considered standard practice in 
the empirically minded and data-driven culture of current times. Citizens of democracies 
trust that the researchers and analysts processing and modeling this data as well as the 
policymakers that use these results to craft legislation are well-informed and relatively 
unbiased in the translation of empirical evidence to policy. There are, of course, plenty of 
examples of misrepresented data and improper application of evidence that the data 
literate among experts are quick to point out. But in general, if presented with the findings 
from a trustworthy source, people will accept them with little question. 
 
The data-laden field of economics is perhaps the pinnacle of data influencing policy. 
Models upon models are produced out of the uncountable dimensions of data from the 
level of household consumers to multi-national corporations to governments themselves. 
Central banks, think tanks, and international economic organizations all use this data to 
predict, model, and explain the functioning of economies. And when the time came to 
analyze the economies of countries in transition from command to market economies in 
the early 1990s, groups like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) jumped at the chance 
to explain economic phenomena like gross domestic product (GDP) growth using the 
models and data they were so familiar with. However, when presented with the peculiar 
nature of these economies, it was concluded that alternative measures should be 
investigated. Such measures included variables that measured policy changes in the form 
of liberalizing reforms. This was not just data that represented reforms, but newly 
generated data that sought to measure the act of policy adoption itself. This was, in many 
ways, a departure for measuring economic growth, and it relied on the formation of new 
indices to capture this phenomenon. 
 
Would anyone question the validity of such indices coming from the likes of the IMF? It 
is unlikely. There is a general understanding in economics—that was perhaps even 
stronger in the 1990s—that these explorations were at the very least valid. This is not to 
insinuate that the IMF was always accurate or in some way immune to criticism, just that 




organizations like the IMF could use them in their work with transitioning countries to 
determine metrics for conditionalities and influence policy (Dreher 2006, p. 769)—and 
economic growth was a specific policy objective (Dreher 2006, p. 772). 
 
What if these new indices were improperly constructed? What if the econometric minds 
of the IMF were not fully aware of the considerations and ramifications of constructing 
indices that were more social science than data science? This could result in serious 
implications when the time came for interpreting the results of studies conducted using 
these indices. The widespread use of the IMF developed cumulative liberalization index 
(CLI) to represent structural reforms in transition countries is a perfect example of this 
problem in action. Without proper consideration given to the structuring of the concept 
of interest, the construction of the index could be considered less valid from the very start. 
This validity then transfers along the index’s path of application, from measurement to 
model to results and policy implications. 
 
 In this paper, these implications of using the cumulative liberalization index will be 
explored by practically examining four different models for economic growth—each 
utilizing a differently constructed aggregation for structural reforms. First, the CLI will 
be analyzed in the lens of concept structuring. By using proper concept structuring theory, 
the CLI will be reconstructed along with three alternatives of aggregation that attempt to 
solve issues of concept structure-measurement inconsistency and vagueness. 
Corresponding methods of measurement for these new aggregations will be determined. 
In addition to the reconstructed CLI, one model will use a statistically derived additive 
method of measurement, another a multiplicative method, and the last will be left 
disaggregated. Next, a model of economic growth in which to embed them for testing will 
be specified and appropriate data will be collected. The models will be compared in a 
practical examination of construct validity, assessing their capacity to predict economic 
growth. The analysis and discussion of these results will follow, including a discussion 
of the implications of the use of these different models and substantively derived 






2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ECONOMIC GROWTH IN TRANSITION 
ECONOMIES AND CONCEPT STRUCTURING 
 
2.1. Economic Growth in Transition Economies 
 
With the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of transition, economists of the time 
were interested to examine these new cases through the lens of economic growth. 
Whereas growth was certainly not a new avenue of exploration, a testing bed of multiple 
countries simultaneously switching from a planned to market economy provided a novel 
and interesting opportunity for study. The beginning of transition coincided with two 
other trends in the field of economics: the rise of endogenous growth theory and the 
dominance of neoliberal economic schools of thought. 
 
Growth theory in the 1990s was, at its core, based on a refutation of neoclassical 
exogenous growth explanations, whereby growth was determined by largely external and 
macroeconomic functions (Romer 1994, p. 3). Endogenous growth theory sought to look 
more inwards to explain growth, while also borrowing certain tools and methods from 
microeconomic analysis. As this theory was gaining popularity in the times of Keynesian 
economic thought, there was an effort to establish Keynesian integration with endogenous 
growth theory as it previously maintained most of the assumptions of neoclassicalism 
(Palley 1996). Politically, all these evolutions occurred during the rise of liberal capitalist 
economic hegemony—informally led by the shadowy “Washington consensus;” perhaps 
less obscurely, groups such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and 
networks of other, smaller liberal policy institutions largely based in the United States 
(US). It is then not difficult to imagine the convergence of these groups and their 
ideologies upon the veritable test bed of the newly liberalizing and independent countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU). 
 
Almost immediately, the focus for explaining growth was concentrated on policies of 
liberalization. Many of the earliest studies contained examinations of the impact of policy, 
as the period of transition was found to be too different or specific in nature to explain 
growth using conventional metrics of growth theory (Merleverde 2000, p. 2). The first 




ubiquitous among the transition countries (see Blanchard 1997; Kornai 1994). In these 
publications, transition from buyers’ to sellers’ market, speed of reform, and investment 
and foreign trade are all explored as priorities for addressing the recessions (Kornai 1994).  
Additionally, factors such as reallocation of resources and restructuring of firms was 
considered (Blanchard 1997). Generally, the consensus was that “the closer a country is 
to a market economy, the more it benefits from the market’s growth generating 
(allocational) efficiency” (Merleverde 2000, p. 7). Hence, this led to the use of policy 
variables in subsequent examinations utilizing econometric models to predict growth. 
In addition to policy liberalization, the literature converged upon two more determinants 
of growth: macroeconomic stabilization and initial conditions (Havrylyshyn et al, 1998, 
p. 12; Lee and Jeong, 2006, p. 242; Merleverde 2000, p. 2). Achieving macroeconomic 
stabilization was consistently found to be a necessary precursor to growth (Fischer et al. 
1996, p. 64; Lougani and Sheets 1997, p. 397). Initial conditions, on the other hand, were 
a bit more controversial regarding their impact. While there is plenty of evidence that 
they have an impact on growth, their relative importance is usually subsumed by their 
impact on or correlation with the policy variables in a model (de Melo et al. 2001, p. 27; 
Fischer and Sahay 2000, p. 22). Subsequent studies have gone on to lessen the role of 
initial conditions by showing that their effects greatly decrease over time (Berg et al. 
1999, p. 53). For this reason and for reasons relating to data structure, initial conditions 
will not be included in the models examined in this paper. Rather, a fixed effects estimate 
will be used instead. 
 
As the various determinants of growth were established, the econometric analysis of 
growth began to accelerate. With this came a need for establishing various indicators and 
aggregations to represent these determinants. The simplest aggregator was the use of a 
proxy for macroeconomic stabilization in the form of the inflation rate (see Havrylyshyn 
et al. 1998; Lee and Jeong 2006). Other studies utilized further indicators for stabilization, 
such as exchange rate regime dummy variables (Fischer et al. 1996). This proxy seems to 
be widely accepted, with Lee and Jeong explaining that it “represent[s] the willingness of 
governments to utilize stabilization policy” (2006, p. 246). The most commonly used 
aggregates for the other two determinants were both established by similar groups of 




components analysis (PCA) method in 1997 (republished in 2001) in their exploration 
“Circumstances and Choice: The Role of Initial Conditions and Policies in Transition 
Economies” (de Melo et al. 2001). They reduced the dimensionality of 11 different initial 
conditions to two components, accounting for roughly 67% of the variation in the original 
11 variables (de Melo et al. 2001, p. 9). These clusters were used in some subsequent 
studies as aggregations representing initial conditions (see Havrylyshyn et al. 1998; 
Merleverde 2003), while others developed their own methods for including initial 
conditions (see Fischer et al. 2000; Fischer and Sahay 2004; Lee and Jeong 2006). 
 
Perhaps the aggregation with the greatest impact, however, was the cumulative 
liberalization index. The CLI was determined by IMF economists and incorporated 
elements of liberalization policy across internal markets, external markets, and 
privatization based on expert opinions from IMF and national experts (de Melo et al. 
1996, p. 403). Since policy changes were considered such an important part of 
explanations of growth, it is no surprise that this index was so popular—especially 
considering the difficulties posed by measurement of such indicators. It was considered 
the default indicator for policy liberalization and was used by almost every researcher at 
the time as such (see de Melo et al. 2001; Fischer and Sahay 2000; Fischer and Sahay 
2004; Lougani and Sheets 1997). Since the period of the CLI was limited, later studies 
went on to utilize the extremely similar European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) transition report liberalization indicators. These appear to have 
borrowed extensively from the CLI format, although this is unconfirmed. What is evident, 
however, is that they were similar enough to be two data sources for a single indicator of 
policy liberalization (see Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 14; Merleverde 2003, p. 655). 
 
A synthesis of all these aggregations was the stylized regression model introduced in 1998 
by IMF economists Oleh Havrylyshyn, Ivailo Ivorski, and Ron van Rooden, wherein they 
made use of the inflation rate proxy, the initial condition clusters, and the CLI to explain 
economic growth in the transition countries. The model (hereafter Havrylyshyn et al.’s 
model or the original model) was fairly successful in explaining growth in a relatively 
simplified manner (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 16). For these reasons, it will serve as a 




the short period of study—only 1990 through 1997. The researchers were constrained by 
the beginning of transition and only had this small period to work with, but that is a rather 
short period to be evaluating panel regressions within. The other issue that persists is the 
use of aggregations. At a surface level, they all seem to make sense and are widely utilized 
in similar studies. But closer examination raises some questions, especially with the CLI. 
The inflation rate proxy is widely used and seems to make sense as an indicator. The 
initial conditions were dimensionally reduced using a PCA. But the CLI seems too simple. 
How can all the information about liberalization be contained in one numerical indicator? 
And why does the CLI assign seemingly arbitrary values to each subcomponent? The 
question this all raises is: which aggregation of the structural reform policy variables (if 
any) are most valid in the context of explaining economic growth? 
 
2.2. Concept Structuring and Construct Validation 
 
The cumulative liberalization index suffers from issues of concept structuring. If we view 
it though a lens of Goertzian concept structuring, we can visualize the three-level 
conceptualization starting with “structural reform” (or “structurally reformed” in 
reference to a specific case) at the basic level. The result of the CLI is used to determine 
how reformed a country is. De Melo et al. create a continuous classification system, with 
some general outlines for low medium and high level of reform according to the end CLI 
score (1996, p. 404). This follows with Goertz’s prescription of continuous classification, 
which minimizes measurement error by not forcing a dichotomous classification and 
allowing for gray zones (Goertz 2006, p. 34). In the case of the CLI it makes even more 
sense as it is a ranking system and is intended to be used in econometric evaluations—a 
dichotomous classification would be too simplified. We can also see that they have 
adequately theorized the negative pole, which in the case of the CLI represents no change 
from a planned economy. 
 
The next levels are formed based on this basic concept. The is where the conceptual 
structuring of the CLI begins to break down. The second level is where a determination 
must be made whether a concept follows the necessary and sufficient condition (AND) 




construction of the index, we must assume that the family resemblance conditions are 
used. The CLI’s basic construction is as follows: 
 
“The liberalization index is the weighted average of the rankings of liberalization in 
the following three areas: 
 Internal markets (I)—liberalization of domestic prices and the abolition of 
state trading monopolies (weight: 0.3) 
 External markets (E)—liberalization of the foreign trade regime, including 
elimination of export controls and taxes, and substitution of low-to-
moderate import duties for import quotas and high import tariffs; current-
account convertibility (weight: 0.3) 
 Private sector entry (P)—privatization of small-scale and large-scale 
enterprises and banking reform (weight: 0.4)” (De Melo et al. 1996, p. 
403). 
 
There is nothing inherently wrong with this, but conceptually this determination must be 
made as it has methodological implications. In the use case of structural reform, it seems 
that family resemblance conditionality is the simpler determination, as there is no need to 
then ponder whether a country could be considered reformed without one of three second 
level concepts: internal market reform, external market reform, and privatization. 
Defining the theoretical relationship between this second level and the basic level concept 
can also help to make this determination by informing the interactions of the formal, 
mathematical principles of concept structuring.  
 
If, in fact, the conditionality is more accurately described as the necessary and sufficient 
condition, then there is an inconsistency between concept and measurement. The creators 
of the CLI make use of an additive (averaging) measurement (de Melo et al. 1996, p. 
403), which is inconsistent with the necessary and sufficient condition as it implies 
substitutability (Goertz 2006, p. 98). The literature is unclear about which conditionality 
is more appropriate. As established, the measurement implies family resemblance. For 
the most part, this conceptualization holds. It would be possible to classify a country as 
an advanced reformer even if one of the three second level concepts lags behind the 
others. However, it might be hard to argue that a country is an advanced reformer if no 
reform takes place in one category while extensive reforms take place in the other two—
an outcome which is possible using the established measurement. For this reason, a 
conceptualization of necessary and sufficient conditionality and multiplicative 





Even if one acquiesces that structural reform can be conceptualized with family 
resemblance conditionality, the method of additive measurement must be justified 
accordingly. It is not explained, for example, why privatization receives a higher 
weighting than internal or external market reform. Without the benefit of peering into the 
mind of the researchers in this case, one is left wondering about a more transparent way 
to aggregate these variables. Perhaps the simplest way is to let the data “speak for itself.” 
Following the lead of the IMF economists in another case of aggregation, one method 
would be to use a PCA to determine the weighting for each indicator within the concept 
as was done with the initial conditions (de Melo et al. 2001). In the course of this and 
through the lens of full substitutability, it would also make sense to simplify the concept 
structure to that of a two-level structure where the indicator level is directly theoretically 
related to basic level of the concept. For this reason, a simplified reconceptualization of 
de Melo et al.’s additive conceptualization will be examined utilizing more transparent 
aggregation methods. 
 
Finally, if we take the idea of substitutability to the extreme, it might also be possible to 
conceptualize each different policy indicator as its own concept. The conceptual 
implication of the CLI is that the latent variable of structural reform can be and has been 
adequately captured by this measurement and aggregation. Perhaps though, in the context 
of explaining growth this conceit places too much emphasis on the concept of structural 
reform writ large and not enough on the various impacts of specific reforms. This non-
aggregative conceptualization will also be examined. It is worth noting, however, that 
there are perhaps methodological reasons for aggregations such as the CLI beyond 
conceptualization. In this case, as noted by the CLI authors, there is high correlation 
between components of the CLI (de Melo et al. 1996, p. 404). This indicates that there 
could be mathematical issues of multicollinearity among the various indicators which 
would decrease the validity of a model which does not in some way aggregate them. 
 
In addition to each of these conceptualizations, a reconstructed version of the original 
CLI will be examined. The examination will be a practical process that explores and 




in the context of economic growth models. As previously determined, the model used 
will be the representative Havrylyshyn et al. model, with a few modifications to account 
for data and the much-extended period of examination. Through the different 
conceptualizations and thusly implied methods of aggregation, we will identify the 
differences in overall output (strength of explanation of economic growth) and also the 
changing nature of the structural reforms component in relation to the other components 
of the model. Each of these presents an opportunity to tell a different story about the 
impact of structural reforms on growth in transition economies and will offer different 
implications in terms of the importance of policy. 
 
This concept structuring is embedded in a larger framework of construct validity. 
Construct validity is either one form of validity (Carmines and Zeller 1979, p. 3), or 
perhaps—as the more recent definitions propose—the underlying form of all validity 
(Strauss and Smith 2009, p. 7). It is a nonjustificationist theory that defines constructs 
based on their place in a network of relationships (Strauss and Smith 2009, p. 9). The test 
portion of this study will be formed around the idea of informative construct validity 
testing. There is no all-encompassing, single test that could be done to determine the 
validity of a construct like the CLI. But the aim for such an investigation as this one 
should merely be to improve the understanding of the construct validity and inform other 
researchers such that they may do their own further testing (Strauss and Smith 2009, p. 
10). 
 
Construct validation is a testing process involving three steps: 
 
1. The theoretical relationship between concepts must be specified, 
2. The empirical relationship between measures of the concepts must be examined, 
and, 
3. The empirical evidence must be examined. (Carmines and Zeller 1979, p. 9). 
 
This simple formula allows for the use of concept structuring to accomplish the first step 
and a practical examination of each of those concepts in an otherwise identical model for 




implications associated with the use of each different conceptualization will be examined 
and discussed. With this, there is an aim to provide an informative study on construct 
validation while perhaps also gaining some substantive insight on the use of structural 
reforms indicators and aggregations in models of economic growth. 
 
2.3.  Conceptualizing Structural Reform and Aggregation Implications 
 
For illustrative purposes, each of the conceptualizations to be used in this study will be 
detailed and diagrammed. There will also be a brief discussion of the measurement 
technique that would apply to each of them. The diagrams will include symbols that 
represent different theoretical relationships between the different levels of the concept. 
Table 2.1 shows how different theoretical relationships imply formal relationships. 
 
Table 2.1 Diagramming theoretical relationships and their implied conditionalities 
 
Theoretical Relationship AND OR Symbol 
    
Ontological Yes Yes  
Causal Yes Yes  
Conjunction of necessary causes Yes No  
Noncausal conjunction of necessary conditions Yes No  
Substitutability No Yes  
Source: based on Table 2.5 in Goertz 2006, p. 54 
 
The indicator level concepts are taken directly from EBRD transition reports (EBRD 
1994). Their application in this study will be explained in greater detail in Section 3.2., 
but they are, in effect, a known substitute for the expert opinion data gathered by de Melo 
et al. (1996). The EBRD indicators span roughly the same spectrum of measurements as 
the original indicators. 
 
The conceptualization of the CLI as specified by de Melo et al. (1996) will be assumed 
based on the measurement implied and what little conceptual context is given to it in the 
original construction. As previously mentioned, the additive nature of the measurement 




evidence to suggest that the relationship between structural reform and the component 
parts of internal market liberalization, external market liberalization, and privatization 
represent a causal relationship in either direction. With these subcomponents, there is 
instead an implication that they are simply representations of different aspects of reform, 
which places them into an ontological relationship. There certainly seems to be an amount 
of substitutability at the indicator level, but this lessens between the three component 
parts and the main concept. While substitutability is not precluded in the ontological 
relationship, it is perhaps a less precise way to classify the relationship. Therefore, the 






















Figure 2.1 Three Level Concept Structure of the Original CLI 

































The relationship between the third level indicators and second level categories implies 
full substitutability, i.e., the absence of one such indicator can still result in a measurement 
across the full spectrum of categorization. This point is functionally meaningless for 
internal and external markets since they only have one indicator apiece. Theoretically it 
is still useful for further applications in which researchers might want to add more 
indicators to these categories. With the relationship fully defined as it is here, there would 
be no further questions in aggregation. For private sector entry, this is useful for this 
study. The four indicators that comprise the measurement of this category will be 
additively aggregated. The three second level indicators are likewise additively 
aggregated, as is done in the original construction, where a weighted average of the three 
component scores is applied to arrive at the final index represented structural reform. 
 
To keep with the spirit of the original construction while simplifying the concept 
structure, the confusion among theoretical relationships can be done away with by 
eliminating the second level of conceptualization. The second level components make it 
difficult to determine the overall structure. Since there is substitutability implied by the 
additive measurement, it may make more sense to consider the ontological relationship 
between the second and third level redundant. Instead, the concept structure would be that 
of a two-level concept, as shown in Figure 2.2. By doing this we can eliminate any 
questions of whether a family resemblance conditionality is appropriate in this case. If 
there is a relationship of substitutability, then let that be the defining conceptualization 
that the family resemblance (OR) conditionality can follow from—and the additive 
measurement can follow from that. 
 
This leads to a question of weighting in the additive aggregation, as the only given 
indication of weighting from the de Melo et al. structure was at the second level. For this 
study, weighting for the two-level additive model will be addressed statistically with a 



























Figure 2.2 Two Level Concept Structure of a Family Resemblance CLI Alternative 
Source: EBRD 1994; based on Goertz 2006 
 
Conversely to this simplified additive concept structure, another approach could be to 
lean into the ambiguity that might suggest a family resemblance conditionality is not 
accurate in the case of structural reform. Instead, what if the three subcomponents of 
internal and external market liberalization and privatization are all necessary and 
sufficient (AND) to indicate structural reform? The relationship could remain as 
ontological, which is technically agnostic to the different conditionalities. It has been 
established that there is no causal mechanism, which leaves a noncausal conjunction of 
necessary conditions as the only remaining relationship option between the top and 




























more sensible to conceptualize the three components as an intrinsic part of structural 
reforms than to view them as a conjunction of three independent phenomena. This would 























Figure 2.3 Three Level Concept Structure of a Necessary and Sufficient CLI Alternative 
Source: de Melo et al. 1996; EBRD 1994; based on Goertz 2006 
 
In this case, the only real change from the assumed structure of the original CLI is the 
implication of a multiplicative measurement instead of an additive one. The 
substitutability of the other structures carries through at the indicator level. This is 



































of theory to inform the conditionality between the second and third level concepts. 
Whereas it would be possible to conceptualize an aggregation of structural reforms that 
requires the presence of all three subcomponents, there is less certainty in requiring the 
presence of each indicator. This is a theoretical debate that would exist well outside the 
scope of this study. 
 
The final concept structure is the simplest, and that is one without aggregation. Each 
indicator exists as its own, separate concept and measurement. There is no diagram 
required for this structure, as it is just six concepts without relationships to higher level 
concepts and thus no conditionalities or implied measurement techniques. 
 
In the next section, these concept structures will be formally integrated into a comparative 





3. METHODOLOGY: ASSESSING STRUCTURAL REFORM AGGREGATIONS 
THROUGH COMPARISON OF REGRESSION MODELS 
 
3.1. Case Selection and Period of Study 
 
When selecting cases for examination, there were three considerations: 
 
1. The cases should be as similar as possible to the cases selected in Havrylyshyn et 
al.’s (1998) original study for the sake of parity. 
2. There should be as many cases as possible selected to capture the most data, and 
3. They must have a nearly complete tranche of data for the indicators selected—
with a few small exceptions. 
 
Thus, this study started with the 25 transition countries from the original model: Albania, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, North Macedonia, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan. From there, any attempt to expand the study was immediately rebuffed 
by the lack of consistent data. This mainly comes down to the former Republics of 
Yugoslavia that did not have consistent borders during the 1990s. This is likely the same 
reason they were not included in the original study—some were not even considered 
sovereign nations in 1998. This list includes the countries now known as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, and Kosovo. Croatia, North Macedonia, and Slovenia 
all appeared to have adequate data, ostensibly because of their earlier declarations of 
independence. There are also several other “transitioning” countries found in later 
editions of the EBRD annual transition reports, but these lack earlier data and are not part 
of the “transition countries” of CEE and the FSU. The final consideration of complete 
data sets eliminated just one country: the Czech Republic. This is due to a request in 2007 
for the Czech Republic to no longer receive funding from the EBRD, which is referred to 
as a “graduation” of sorts (Reiserer 2021). Whatever the impetus or reasoning, there are 
seven years of vital missing data that cannot be supplemented from elsewhere, meaning 




final outputs, although the Czech Republic is often symbolically presented as a success 
in transition (Ekiert 1998). 
 
The period of evaluation was similarly decided by the availability of EBRD data. The 
specific indicators used were available only between 1994 and 2014 (EBRD 1994-2014). 
A further discussion of this EBRD data as it relates to the period analyzed can be found 
in Section 3.2., in which the decision not to include earlier data from a separate source as 
a supplement is justified. 
 
3.2. Data Selection 
 
The largest initial problem to overcome in this study is that of data availability. The 
original model’s database was purpose built by Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) using some 
metrics that are not widely available—most notably, the cumulative liberalization index. 
Additionally, data must be collected for the extended period of study. Certain data was 
relatively easy to recreate, while other indicators required reconstruction or representative 
indicators. In all instances, much like case selection, there was an effort to maintain parity 
with the data and indicators of the original model. Aside from the variously 
conceptualized and aggregated structural reforms components, the rest of the model and 
underlying data will remain the same throughout the testing. 
 
GDP percent growth, inflation rate data, government expenditures, and foreign direct 
investment data were available from the World Bank Open Data database. The CLI was 
recreated in a similar manner to its supplementation in Havrylyshyn et al.’s original data: 
EBRD report statistics. For the reasons explained in Section 3.4., initial conditions will 
not be part of these models. 
 
There are some indicators that should remain largely unchanged. The dependent variable 
in this model is GDP growth (annual percent) and was taken from the World Bank Open 
Data database, which is a subset of World Bank’s Data Bank (World Bank, 2021). The 
original model used the same GDP growth metric from “the authorities,” as it is likely 




(Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 14). With the reliability and data capturing abilities of our 
current international financial institutions, this is now less of an issue. Havrylyshyn et al. 
(1998) are also very specific in their classification of the dependent variable as the growth 
rate of real GDP (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 13). This is as opposed to nominal GDP. 
The World Bank GDP metrics all measure real GDP unless it is specifically demarcated 
as “nominal.” This indicator in the updated models should be functionally identical to the 
dependent variable in the original models. 
 
Using GDP percent growth to represent economic growth is a widely accepted practice. 
Certainly, at the time the original studies on transition economy growth were taking place, 
it was the default option with few challengers. In recent times, GDP percent growth as an 
indicator has come into question as it may not fully capture the depth of economic 
growth—especially when considering ideas such as sustainable growth (European 
Environment Agency 2021). While there are movements towards developing more 
comprehensive growth metrics, GDP percent growth continues as the default indicator 
(van den Bergh and Antal 2014). For the purposes of this study, it is also the most 
appropriate metric to consider. While the reasoning behind abandoning or supplementing 
GDP percent growth is compelling, this study is not a critique of growth indicators. There 
is no intention to comment on the ethics or responsibility in the field of economics. 
Further, since this study is a critique of the earlier models and indices used, there should 
be as much continuity as possible in the newly constructed models for comparative 
reasons. With certain indicators already being replaced out of necessity in data 
availability, as much of the original model should be preserved as possible. However, 
when considering the results of this econometric analysis, further studies could be 
pursued using alternate indicators of economic growth. 
 
The proxy of macroeconomic stabilization policies will remain as an inflation metric. The 
literature is quite in agreement that stabilization is an important indicator and a likely 
candidate for predicting growth (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 11). In effect, the 
macroeconomic policies aimed at stabilization are usually concerned primarily or 
secondarily with controlling the rate of inflation (OECD 2014, p. 4). In light of this, and 




the rate of inflation will continue to be used to measure macroeconomic policies and 
should not be attempted to be disaggregated. Whether or not to use the natural logarithm 
linearized version of this indicator is a matter of subjective debate.  
 
The original model makes use of this linearization method and the justification is not 
explicitly stated, but clear enough. With inflation rate values into the thousands in the 
early transition period in some countries, these could be seen as outliers that might skew 
the data wildly. Intuitively it also makes some sense to interpret inflation on a log-scale—
if the inflation rate is 1% that is good, if it then jumps to 10% immediately after, that is 
bad. But if it jumps to 20 or 30%, it is roughly the same level of bad. If it jumps 100 or 
200% in one year, it does not really make a difference—there are major issues occurring 
either way. On the other hand, linearizing the inflation rates with a logarithm presents 
some problems of its own. 
 
The number one issue is the presence of negative inflation rates in the data—one cannot 
take a logarithm of a negative value. While they are not common, these are interesting 
points of data that one might imagine could have valid explanatory value. If the inflation 
rate is linearized, there are two options—neither all that appealing. The data can be left 
blank, which not only means the explanation of negative inflation will be missing but that 
the entire entry for that country for the year in which the inflation was negative will be 
excluded from the regression calculations. This has a compounding effect in the overall 
model validity. The other option is to add a constant to every point of inflation rate data 
such that they are all positive. This is, in essence, shifting the origin to a more favorable 
position. Before a transformation occurs, this comparison should not affect the 
explanatory value of the indicator—for every percent increase in inflation, it will result 
in the same change to the growth rate. It is after the logarithmic transformation that this 
could result in problems. If the constant is relatively small, then the effect would be 
minimal. Therefore, if the highest absolute value of negative inflation is only one or two 
percent, the linearization would be like that of a situation with no negative inflation. 
However, in our case, the largest negative inflation is roughly -18.8%. This means a 
constant of roughly 18.9% would need to be added, which throws off the earlier explored 




data in this study will remain un-linearized. The raw inflation rates might introduce some 
outlier data in the early years of transition with exceptionally high inflation rates, but that 
is the more acceptable alternative in this case to preserve the explanatory power of the 
indicator. 
 
The original model uses the consumer price index (CPI) model for year-on-year inflation 
rate change from the same “authorities” as the GDP data (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 14). 
In our updated models we will instead use the inflation rates calculated based on the GDP 
deflator. Though they are different methods of calculation, they should theoretically 
measure the same thing. The reasoning for the switch is purely a matter of data 
availability. While maintaining parity to the original model is the first goal of 
reconstructing the database, there are a few countries with limited or no data for CPI 
inflation rates—namely the Central Asian countries. In the compromise between 
eliminating several of the Central Asian cases and using a different method of determining 
inflation rates, maintaining similar cases to the original model is a far more acceptable 
solution in terms of comparability. The data for inflation based on the GDP deflator as an 
annual percent in this study comes from the World Bank Open Data (2021) database, who 
in turn sourced it from World Bank national accounts and OECD National Accounts data 
files. 
 
An indicator to measure the effects of government size was included in the original model, 
and though it was not aggregated, it was loosely associated with structural reforms as a 
sort of control variable to represent “factors such as crowding out, distortions through 
high taxation, and large bureaucracies” (Havrylyshyn et al. 1998, p. 13). The original 
model uses the indicator of general government expenditures as a percent of GDP, which 
came from their own IMF data and staff estimates. We will use the same indicator under 
a different name. The “general government expenditures as a percent of GDP” metric is 
now referred to as “government final consumption as a percent of GDP.” The data for 
this indicator was also sourced from the World Bank Open Data (2021) database and was 






There is one indicator that will be included in this study that was not found in 
Havrylyshyn et al.’s original model, although it was tested for inclusion. In the context of 
the original model, it was determined that foreign direct investment (FDI) “only gives 
significant results when structural reforms are not accounted for in the model 
specification” (Havrylyshyn et al, 1998, p. 24). Judging from preliminary analysis, it is 
likely that this has changed. With an extended period of analysis, FDI may account for as 
much if not more effect on growth than structural reforms. For this reason, it will be 
included in the updated models. Once again, the World Bank Open Data (2021) database 
is the source of FDI net inflows as a percent of GDP data, but the sources the database 
pulls from for this indicator are the International Monetary Fund, International Financial 
Statistics and Balance of Payments databases, World Bank, International Debt Statistics, 
and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
 
The cumulative liberalization index was the most difficult part of recreating the data set. 
Because of the “expert opinion” nature and limited time frame, it is unlikely that a 
completely accurate recreation can be devised. There is however, a very similar and useful 
alternative that Havrylyshyn et al. (1998) used in their original model to supplement the 
CLI data for years that the CLI did not cover. This can be found in the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development annual transition reports (1994-2014), where they 
assign yearly scores across roughly the same spectrum of indicators as De Melo et al. 
(1996) in their original CLI. Ostensibly, while supplementing this data in the data set for 
the Havrylyshyn et al. model there was some necessary yet undocumented data 
transformations that took place. The important takeaway from this, however, is that the 
EBRD indicators were considered close enough to the original CLI indicators to be 
considered a candidate for integration, not just replacement. Although the methodology 
in the first EBRD transition report does not cite the CLI as the basis of their scoring 
system, it seems to be a spiritual successor (EBRD 1994, p. 9).  Aside from differences 
in scale—each area in the CLI is assigned a score from 0 to 1, while each indicator in the 
EBRD reports ranges from 1 to 4—the subcomponents seem to match quite well. The six 
indicators in the first EBRD annual report are: Large-scale privatization, small-scale 
privatization, enterprise restructuring, price liberalization and competition, trade and 




assumed for the CLI, a recreation of the CLI using the EBRD report statistics could be 
mapped as shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
With the reconstructed CLI mapped, an indicator using this process can be included in 
the data set. Again, it is not the suggestion of the author that this reconstructed CLI is an 




Figure 3.1 Reconstruction and weighting of the CLI from EBRD indicators 
Sources: De Melo et al, 2001; and EBRD Transition Report, 1994 
 
The availability of EBRD transition indicators was nearly the sole determinant of the time 
period of this study. The last year in which these indicators were published was 2014 
(ERBD 2014); continuing the analysis beyond this point would be nearly impossible. The 
starting point, however, is a more interesting question. With the integration of the original 




1997. The CLI was determined for the transition countries between 1989 and 1994, while 
the EBRD began publishing their statistics in 1994. What this indicates is an unenviable 
position of compromise for Havrylyshyn et al. To conduct the most effective analysis the 
longest possible time period should be used, but they were limited to sets of indicators 
from two separate and rather short periods. Although they were, as mentioned, highly 
comparable in their construction, it is still a compromise of validity to use data from two 
separate sources—especially if it is expert opinion data from two different panels of 
experts. They also started perhaps a bit early, as by 1990 transition was not in full effect 
in every country—the USSR was still united. Though it may be missing some of the 
earliest transition data, we now have the luxury of using one set of indicators to form the 
reconstructed CLI with 21 years’ worth of data. The original model was, by necessity, 
evaluating only short-run growth. Now, it will be possible to evaluate this method based 
on medium-to-long run growth. 
 
3.3. Four Aggregations of Structural Reform in Models and Measurement of Impact 
on Economic Growth 
 
In addition to the reconstructed CLI, there are three other aggregations to explore that 
have been implied by our conceptualization in Section 2.3.: 
 
1. The reconstructed CLI is an intuitively weighted additive aggregation, meant to 
recreate the original CLI of de Melo et al. (1996). 
2. The PCA CLI is a statistically weighted additive aggregation utilizing a principal 
component analysis. 
3. The multiplicative CLI (mCLI) is a multiplicative aggregation implied by the low-
substitutability, necessary and sufficient conditionality conceptualization. 
4. The disaggregated policy indicators are not aggregated in any way. 
 
 
For the PCA CLI, a simple PCA will be performed on the EBRD indicators and the 
resultant statistics will inform the choice of how many components should be used to 
capture the variance across these indicators. This will assign new weightings for each 




our concept structure. The use of PCA to form descriptive aggregations in time series and 
panel data is widely used, and the descriptive nature enables us to largely ignore some of 
the more technical complications present with PCA (Jolliffe 2010, p. 299). 
 
Recall the two-level concept structure presented in Figure 2.2 on page 17. A quick 
assessment can be made whether a PCA will make sense to run by examining the 
correlation between these variables. As seen in Figure 3.2, all of these variables are quite 
highly, positively correlated to each other. This lends extra validity to this measure for 
statistical reasons along with our descriptive motivation for aggregation. The PCA is run 
and the results are visualized in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.1 With the first component of the 
PCA explaining over 70% of the variance among these indicators, it adequately captures 
enough of the variation to be the sole component necessary to create the new aggregation. 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Correlation matrix of EBRD indicators 





Figure 3.3 Visualized proportion of variance attributed to each PCA component 
Source: EBRD 1994; Author’s data 
 
Table 3.1 Numerical proportion of variance attributed to each PCA component 
 
Source: EBRD 1994; Author’s data 
 
Comp. 1 Comp 2. Comp. 3 Comp. 4 Comp. 5 Comp. 6 
Proportion of 
Variance 
0.716 0.103 0.066 0.054 0.0338 0.027 
Cumulative 
Proportion 













Source: EBRD 1994; Author’s data 
 
The weighting or “loadings” associated with each indicator in the first component are 
given in Table 3.2 The aggregation of EBRD indicators using the PCA Component 1 
loadings will be considered the PCA CLI. A comparison of the given index values 
between the reconstructed and PCA CLIs can be seen in Figure 3.4. While the two 
additive measures tend to trend in the same directions, there is an observable tendency of 
the PCA CLI to exaggerate the differences from year to year compared to the “flatter” 
reconstructed CLI values. 
  
Indicator Component 1 Loading 
Large-scale Privatization 0.466 
Small-scale Privatization 0.376 
Enterprise Restructuring 0.377 
Price Liberalization 0.241 
Trade and Foreign Exchange System Liberalization 0.467 





 Figure 3.4 Comparison of additive aggregations over time across countries: Reconstructed CLI and PCA CLI 
Source: de Melo et al. 1996; EBRD 1994; Author’s data 
Legend: 
 Reconstructed CLI 




The mCLI will be constructed using a multiplicative measurement. The first step is to 
transform all the EBRD data into an appropriate scale, since the basis of multiplicative 
measurements is to indicate an absence of the concept if one indicator (or second level 
concept, in our case) has a value of zero. Since the EBRD scale starts at one in the case 
of absence of change, one will be subtracted across all the indicators such that it will 
instead span from zero to three. This scale transformation will have no other impact than 
allowing the correct use of a multiplicative measurement. The four indicators for the 
privatization component will be averaged according to the conceptual structure in Section 
2.3. and Figure 2.3 (p. 18). Then, the three second level concepts will be multiplied 
together. This is a different scale from the additive measurements, but they are still 
comparable if the impact on the coefficient estimate in the regression is considered. When 
examining the plots of the mCLI (see Figure 3.5), the same trends as the two additive 
models are still evident—albeit in a far more exaggerated manner. Not only are the lower 
scores heavily penalized (see Turkmenistan, Belarus), but smaller increases in score can 
lead to large jumps in the scale (see Latvia, Slovak Republic).  
 
Finally, and once again, the disaggregated model need not be “constructed,” as each 
indicator will stand on its own when evaluated. 
 
The four aggregations above will then be plugged into otherwise identical models of 
economic growth. These four models serve as the independent variable of the thesis and 
are categorized according to their conceptually implied aggregation of structural reforms: 
 
1. The intuitive-additive model, which uses the reconstructed CLI to aggregate 
structural reforms. 
2. The statistical-additive model, which uses the PCA CLI to aggregate structural 
reforms. 
3. The multiplicative model, which uses the mCLI to aggregate structural reforms. 






Figure 3.5 Multiplicative CLI over time across countries 




We can observe a direct line running all the way through from conceptualization to 
aggregation to modelling, where a change at the concept level can have a direct impact 
on how each model will function. 
 
Comparing the models will be an assessment that involves comparing their explanation 
of economic growth. The adjusted coefficient of determination (R2adj) will be used to 
preliminarily identify the overall model goodness of fit. The R2adj is more resilient to the 
bias introduced with more independent variables than the non-adjusted R2 statistic, but it 
is not immune. Therefore, we will likely see a higher R2adj in the case of the disaggregated 
model. For this reason, we will also directly compare the prediction errors of the models 
by plotting them against the actual GDP growth data. This will give more illustrative 
examples of how the models differ in their predictive power. 
 
The implications of these findings will be discussed in the context of how these models 
can be used to promote or obscure different findings when it comes to the aggregation of 
structural reforms—and the possible policy implications thereof. For this we will return 
to the regression statistics and evaluate how each aggregation performs within the model 
in relation to the others. Again, we may experience some issues with the disaggregated 
model in the form of multicollinearity between the EBRD indicators. This could result in 
inflated significance of certain variables. 
 
Finally, if possible, the substantive results of the analysis can be used to propose 
modifications to the use of structural reforms aggregations or indicators that would 












The general structure of the testing method is as follows: 
1. Establish the “base model” in which only the lagged dependent variable is used 
to explain economic growth. All other models will be evaluated in the context of 
this finding. 
2. Run a regression and report the resultant statistics of the intuitive-additive, 
statistical-additive, and multiplicative models. 
3. Test the disaggregated model for multicollinearity. 
4. Run a regression and report the resultant statistics of the disaggregated model. 
5. Compare the results of the regression statistics. 
6. Compare the prediction errors of the models. 
7. Discuss these findings, limitations, and implications of the different aggregations. 
8. Propose modifications to the use of structural reforms indicators or aggregations. 
 
3.4. Specification of Models 
 
To obtain the necessary outputs and statistics to compare our models, we will perform a 
fixed-effects panel regression on each set of data inputs. These regressions will be 
performed in the statistical computing software environment R using the “plm” package 
of linear models for panel data. The plm package enables us to run an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) model across panel data while accounting for heterogeneity between 
countries without including the country specific constants in the goodness of fit 
calculations. This is an alternative to using a least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) 
model which would assign the country specific constants to dummy variables and include 
them in the goodness of fit. Since we have decided that we are primarily interested in the 
effects of the variable data on economic growth, the plm package enables a simple 
solution to include fixed-effects while ignoring their explanatory impact. 
 
As opposed to a normal regression model, a panel regression allows for comparison of 
multiple variables across time periods from multiple cases or locations (in our case, the 
selected transition countries). Whereas a simple regression would only be able to address 
this kind of data across a single case, the panel regression takes the data from every case 




across time for many different cases. There is, however, a danger of bias implicit to this 
type of comparison when the fundamental or constant differences between cases are 
considered. How can all these countries be compared without accounting for all the 
differences between them like size, geography, differences in income and cost of living, 
and countless other small factors that could contribute to a model of growth? To account 
for these factors, we introduce the idea of fixed-effects. 
 
Surely, initial conditions are important when investigating growth in a transition 
economy. As determined in the literature review, this is an area that received plenty of 
attention at the time. But the stylized regression model proposed by Havrylyshyn et al. 
should be a fundamentally different exploration; it sought to determine how policy 
indicators which vary over time explained economic growth, with what should have been 
no regard for constant factors. The inclusion of these effects cannot simply be discarded, 
but that is precisely why fixed-effects methods exist. By accounting for the constant 
differences between cases, a distinct constant value is included in each individual case’s 
regression. This has the desired effect of neatly packaging all the extraneous constant 
information that varies between cases to allow for direct comparison of the desired factors 
and how they vary within cases. 
 
In Havrylyshyn et al.’s conclusion, it was therefore no surprise that they found their 
various initial conditions had very little explanatory value in the model (Havrylyshyn et 
al. 1998, p. 32). Additionally, Havrylyshyn et al. (1998, p. 32) find that earlier 
assumptions about initial conditions might be incorrect, as the usefulness of initial 
conditions in predicting growth diminishes over time. In our case this will be even more 
pronounced, as we start from a later point and have expanded the period of study. 
Therefore, a fixed-effects estimate remains the most appropriate way to account for 
differences between cases without specifying the model to a degree of granularity that 
would defeat the very purpose of a “stylized” model. Mathematically, the use of fixed 
versus random effects in regression modelling for panel data tends to make no difference 
when the number of cases (countries in our case) is fixed and the period of study is large 




as will be determined regarding the lagged dependent variable. Therefore, we will stick 
with our theoretical understanding of fixed effects and use them in our models. 
 
The other idiosyncrasy of the model implied by the data structure is the lagged dependent 
variable (LDV). Utilizing a Breusch-Godfrey Test for serial correlation in panel models, 
it was determined that all proposed models were highly serially correlated, which is not 
surprising in a case like growth prediction. The growth rate last year will likely influence 
the growth rate this year. The original model would have almost certainly included the 
LDV as a predictor were it not for the high degree of biased parameter estimates it 
introduces to a fixed effects model over short periods of evaluation (Beck and Katz 2011, 
p. 342). This is one benefit of expanding the period of study. When the period is 20 years 
or greater (as in our case), this bias becomes very small to the point where it can be 
disregarded (Beck and Katz 2011, p. 342). The LDV will be used in this study to give a 
baseline predictive model and increase the overall predictive powers of each model. It is 
the same GDP percent growth data as the dependent variable, lagged by one year. 
 
With the considerations and peculiarities of these models dealt with, the models can now 
be specified. 
 
1. Intuitive-additive model: 
 
𝐺𝑅 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐺𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐶𝐿𝐼 , +   𝛽 𝐼𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐺𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝐹𝐷𝐼 , + ∈ ,  
 
where: 
 𝑖 represents the case or country, 
 𝑡 represents the year, 
 𝐺𝑅 is the indicator for percent GDP growth, 
 𝛼 is the country specific fixed-effect, 
 𝛽  are the coefficient estimates for each independent variable, 
𝐶𝐿𝐼 represents the reconstructed CLI, 
𝐼𝑅 is the indicator for inflation rate based on the GDP deflator, 




 𝐹𝐷𝐼 is the indicator for FDI as a percent of GDP, and 
 ∈ is the error term. 
 
2. Statistical-additive model: 
 
𝐺𝑅 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐺𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝑃𝐶𝐴 , +   𝛽 𝐼𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐺𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝐹𝐷𝐼 , + ∈ ,  
 
where: 
𝑃𝐶𝐴 represents the PCA CLI, and the other terms remain the same as in the 
intuitive-additive model. 
 
3. Multiplicative model: 
 
𝐺𝑅 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐺𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝑚𝐶𝐿𝐼 , +   𝛽 𝐼𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐺𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝐹𝐷𝐼 , + ∈ ,  
 
where: 
𝑚𝐶𝐿𝐼 represents the multiplicative CLI, and the other terms remain the same as 
in the other models. 
 
4. Disaggregated model: 
 
𝐺𝑅 , =  𝛼 +  𝛽 𝐺𝑅 , +  𝛽 𝐿𝑆𝑃 , + 𝛽 𝑆𝑆𝑃 , + 𝛽 𝐸𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝑃𝐿 , + 𝛽 𝑇𝐹𝐸 ,
+ 𝛽 𝐵𝐹 , + 𝛽 𝐼𝑅 , + 𝛽 𝐺𝐸 , + 𝛽 𝐹𝐷𝐼 , + ∈ ,  
where: 
 𝐿𝑆𝑃 is the policy indicator for large-scale privatization, 
 𝑆𝑆𝑃 is the policy indicator for small-scale privatization, 
 𝐸𝑅 is the policy indicator for enterprise restructuring, 
 𝑃𝐿 is the policy indicator for price liberalization, 
 𝑇𝐹𝐸 is the policy indicator for trade and foreign exchange system liberalization, 
𝐵𝐹 is the policy indicator for banking reform, and the other terms remain the same 







The expectations for the results of this study, having seen the data and based on previous 
results with similar indicators, are that the intuitive-additive model will have the lowest 
explanatory value and the disaggregated model will have the highest. The statistical-
additive and multiplicative models will lie somewhere in the middle. The main concern 
in terms of explanatory power comes from the EBRD transition policy variables. 
 
While the reliability of the data is not under question, its validity as a predictor of 
economic growth from 1994 to 2014 is not promising. As shown in Figure 3.4 on page 
31, there is a quite distinct tendency of the reconstructed CLI data to attain a certain level 
of progress according to the EBRD and then simply stagnate. When looking at Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, or the Slovak Republic, this is not surprising as they all near 
the top of the scale after a time. But even for countries which failed to achieve the highest 
scores like Belarus, Russia, and the Central Asian nations, they still seem to stagnate at a 
certain point. What this indicates is that countries adopted virtually all the liberal policies 
that they were going to adopt relatively early in transition, then simply stopped. By the 
mid-2000s, even those who seemed to be lagging were not making any more progress on 
the EBRD transition scale. With this stagnation in the later years of the period of 
examination, the CLI and even the individual EBRD indicators almost begin to resemble 
constants—meaning whatever explanatory power they might have had in early transition 
will likely be muted by the lack of variation in later transition. With that in mind, the 
aggregation of the EBRD indicators into the reconstructed CLI seems an even worse idea. 
What little variation there might have been left will be completely obscured through the 
averaging process. The PCA and multiplicative CLI reaggregation processes, while more 
effective than the reconstructed CLI, will still yield lesser results than the fully 
disaggregated model in this case. It would be considered a qualified success if the 
statistical-additive or multiplicative model is nearly as useful for predicting growth as the 
disaggregated model, as they are supposed to be “stylized” versions. Realistically, the 
complexity difference between any of these models is not enough to justify the loss of 





Another dimension of increasing the time period of the study that must be taken into 
account is the effect of exogenous shocks, most notably the global financial crisis of 2008. 
When viewing the GDP growth trends in Figure 3.6, it is plainly evident that the years 
directly following the crisis were deeply impacted by it. While it is possible that some 
indicators might capture this variation incidentally (increasing inflation, decreasing FDI 
or government expenditures), we know from examining the raw EBRD data (see 
Appendix A for raw input data) and reconstructed CLI that these policy indicators show 
no signs of change to account for this. Outside of the early years of transition, the impact 
of the crisis is the most significant change in GDP growth data. This should result in 
another mark against the explanatory power of the reconstructed CLI as well as the 
individual EBRD indicators. 
 
The choice in this study to eliminate the initial condition constants in favor of a fixed-
effects model should result in some change to explanatory power. Because the method of 
analysis specifically does not include the estimated constant country differences in the 
evaluation of goodness of fit, this should result in lower goodness of fit across all three 
models we will test. However, this is justified by the fact that we are deciding to exclude 
the country specific differences in initial conditions from our analysis in favor of a more 
mathematical approach; we are interested in explanatory power of what can be compared 
directly across countries. The fixed-effects regression gives us the opportunity to do this 
by mathematically accounting for these differences instead of relying on manually 
determined constant inputs from the researchers. These inputs would be impossibly 
exhaustive in the best case, and detrimentally incomplete in the worst case. 
 
The goodness of fit effects introduced by the fixed effects will likely be entirely offset by 
the positive effects of including the LDV. Since we know these models are serially 
correlated, we can assume that a high amount of explanatory power resides in the LDV. 





Figure 3.6 GDP Growth per year by county 




The last expectation that should be mentioned is the role of the FDI variable. Although 
excluded for lack of explanatory power in the original model, we expect that to change 
as the period of study lengthened and progress in transition increased greatly. We know 
that in CEE and the FSU where technology gaps are not very wide that the countries with 
the most significant growth and success are also the countries with some of the highest 
rates of FDI (Lim, 2001). Based upon these indications as well as some preliminary 
analysis, it seems likely that FDI has taken on much more importance in explaining 
economic growth since 1997. Upon the decision to exclude FDI from the original model, 
Havrylyshyn et al. (1998. p. 24) posited that while there is a broad correlation between 
economic growth and FDI, this correlation is more likely related to both being explained 
by the policy indicators; the same factors that promote growth may also attract FDI. While 
this may be true, we expect to find that FDI has more of an impact on growth than 
originally estimated. Further, even if growth and FDI are influenced by the same factors, 







4. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS: EVALUATING STRUCTURAL 
REFORM AGGREGATIONS THROUGH COMPETING MODELS FOR 
GROWTH IN 24 TRANSITION ECONOMIES FROM 1994 TO 2014 
 
4.1. Regression Results 
 
The analysis begins by established the baseline model of LDV explanation of economic 
growth. Table 4.1 provides a comparison table of the regression statistics across all of the 
tested models. The R2adj value is not particularly high in the case of the baseline model, 
but enough to give a good idea of what to expect from the other models in terms of better 
explanation. From here, the other models can be analyzed. 
 
Next is the analysis of the intuitive-additive model, using the aggregation of structural 
reforms based on the original CLI (see Table 4.1, column “Intuitive-Additive”). The 
initial impressions are much as expected. The inclusion of extra variables indicates a 
better goodness of fit, but that is probably as much related to the number of variables as 
it is their explanatory power. We also see the relative explanatory power of the 
reconstructed CLI is the lowest of any variable. Perhaps the most surprising result is the 
negative relationship between the reconstructed CLI and the dependent variable of 
economic growth. This marks a departure from the results of other studies using the CLI. 
Assessing changes in the relation of structural reform measures to economic growth is 
not the primary goal of testing these models, but it is interesting to note nonetheless. 
 
Initial observations based on the R2adj and significance of the PCA CLI indicate that this 
aggregation can explain economic growth slightly better than the reconstructed CLI (See 
Table 4.1, column “Statistical-Additive”). Really though, the difference is miniscule. 
Although the PCA loadings result in different values for the PCA CLI, they are not so 
dissimilar from the weightings given in the reconstructed CLI that a drastically different 









Dependent Variable: Economic Growth 
 
 Baseline Model Intuitive-Additive Statistical-Additive Multiplicative Disaggregated 
Reconstructed CLI  
-1.603* 
   
  (0.050223)       
PCA CLI   
-0.769** 
  
    (0.039727)     
Multiplicative CLI    
-0.110** 
 
      (0.018521)   
Large-scale Privatization     
-1.132* 
        (0.05763) 
Small-scale Privatization     
2.564*** 
        (0.001705) 
Enterprise Restructuring     
-0.98 
        (0.184486) 
Price Liberalization     
-0.112 
        (0.846611) 
Trade and Foreign Exchange System 
Liberalization 
    
-1.426* 
        (0.060718) 
Banking Reform     
-0.487 
        (0.392833) 
Lagged Dependent Variable 
0.441*** 0.344*** 0.345*** 0.339*** 0.294*** 
(<0.00000001) (<0.00000001) (<0.00000001) (<0.00000001) (<0.00000001) 
Inflation Rate  
-0.013*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** 
  (0.0000011) (0.00000094) (0.0000013) (0.000065) 
Government Expenditures  
-0.367*** -0.355*** -0.363*** -0.384*** 
  (0.0000637) (0.0000874) (0.0000642) (0.000039) 
Foreign Direct Investment  
0.107*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 0.117*** 
  (0.006277) (0.005411) (0.004897) (0.002908) 
Countries 24 24 24 24 24 
Years 18-20  18-20  18-20  18-20  18-20  
Observations 472 470 470 470 470 
R2 0.26 0.32915 0.32975 0.33175 0.35002 
Adjusted R2 0.221 0.28655 0.28719 0.28932 0.30082 
F statistic 157.36 (df = 1; 447) 43.274 (df = 5; 441) 43.392 (df = 5; 441) 43.786 (df = 5; 441) 23.479 (df = 10; 436) 
Table 4.1 Fixed effects panel regression results for four models of economic growth and baseline model 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01; p-values are listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates 




The multiplicative model continues this trend of very slight improvement. Once again, 
there is a slight improvement in terms of the R2adj—this time it is an improvement over 
both the additive models (See Table 4.1, column “Multiplicative”). The significance of 
the structural reform aggregation has also increased slightly. It is interesting to note that 
even though the scale and construction of the aggregation has changed, the results are still 
rather similar. 
 
Lastly, we will assess the performance of the disaggregated model. Since it will make use 
of six variables representing different kinds of structural reform instead of aggregating 
them into one, the usefulness of comparing the R2adj and significance of the variables to 
the other models will be lessened. R2adj will be inflated through the introduction of extra 
variables and the significance of the individual EBRD indicators could be inflated through 
multicollinearity. To predict how multicollinearity might affect the results we will use a 
Farrar-Glauber test on a pooled OLS version of the disaggregated model to provide 
diagnostics that inform our assessment. Remembering the correlation matrix (see Figure 
3.2, p. 28), we can proceed in assuming we are likely to find multicollinearity among the 
EBRD indicators since they are all relatively highly correlated with each other. Indeed, 
the output for overall diagnostic testing indicates that collinearity was detected. For 
diagnostics relating to the individuals, the variance inflation factor (VIF) is used as an 
indicator. A VIF in excess of 10 is considered high, and a VIF above 5 is considered 
medium. Table 4.2 shows the associated VIF scores for each EBRD variable. Small-scale 
privatization has the highest VIF at 4.12. The rest of the indicators have VIF scores below 
four. This test reveals that while there is a concern of multicollinearity influencing the 
results of a regression, it is not so high that variables should be eliminated of aggregated 
for mathematical reasons. Therefore, we will proceed with the disaggregated regression, 



















Source: EBRD 1994; Author’s data 
 
For the reasons listed above of adding extra variables and introducing heightened 
multicollinearity, the R2adj and significance of the variables cannot be reliably compared 
to the other models examined in this section. The R2adj is higher than the other models 
which indicates a better goodness of fit, but it is not clear whether that is entirely due to 
the additional variables or if the predictive power is truly better. In the discussion section 
this will be addressed by comparing the accuracy of prediction using the prediction errors 
generated by the regression. Likewise, the significance of small-scale privatization seems 
to be much higher than any of the other EBRD indicators, but it is difficult to say whether 
this is simply a result of its outsized VIF. Since the VIF is below five, it would be safe to 
assume that at least some amount of its significance is truly due to the predictive power 
inherent in the indicator. Assigning some specific measurement to this, however, remains 
elusive. 
 
In the discussion section which follows, the four models will be compared using the 
statistical results of the regressions and an analysis of the fitted versus actual values each 
model generates. Limitations encountered in this examination will also be addressed. 





Large-scale Privatization 2.63 
Small-scale Privatization 4.12 
Enterprise Restructuring 2.97 
Price Liberalization 1.86 
Trade and Foreign Exchange System Liberalization 3.43 






In comparing the four different models, there is an overwhelming pattern observed of 
similar goodness of fit and predictive capabilities. Looking at Table 4.3, we can see a 
summary of the most relevant regression statistics across models. 
 
Table 4.3 Selected regression statistics for comparison 
 
Model R2adj 
Significance of Structural Reforms Aggregation 
(p-value) 
Baseline 0.221 - 
Intuitive-Additive 0.28655 0.050223 
Statistical-Additive 0.28719 0.039727 
Multiplicative 0.28932 0.018521 
Disaggregated 0.30082 0.001705 - 0.846611* 
*The range of all significance statistics across six indicators is represented. 
Source: Table 4.1, p. 44 
 
The first three models can be compared more directly using these statistics, as they have 
the same number of variables. In comparing them, we see that the goodness of fit is 
incredibly similar (though increasing in descending order). The p-values of the structural 
reform aggregation components are a bit more differentiated, as it transitions from a 
significance of over 0.05 in the intuitive-additive model (above the significance threshold 
in many cases), to 0.03 in the statistical-additive model and 0.01 in the multiplicative 
model. The latter two p-values are below the standard 0.05 threshold for significance in 
regression modeling. The disparity between these two statistics indicates that while the 
type of structural reform might not have a large impact on the overall goodness of fit of 
the model it is contained within, the type of aggregation can lend validity to the model 
with a lower p-value and thus higher significance. For reasons enumerated in the previous 
section, neither of these measures are very useful in comparing the disaggregated model 




largely addressed—the indicators themselves can vary quite widely in significance within 
the model. 
 
To compare the disaggregated model more directly with the others, and to observe general 
trends in prediction among all the models, a plot of actual vs. fitted values for GDP growth 
percent will be examined. As is shown in Figure 4.1, once again all the models show a 
general trend towards similar predictive power. 
 
Figure 4.1 Actual vs. fitted GDP Growth across four models 
 




By assessing the level to which the fitted values on the y-axis match with the actual values 
along the x-axis (perfect prediction would align along the line of equality), we can see 
that there a very few discernable differences between the models. Among all four there is 
a general tendency to under-predict growth when it is low or negative and over-predict as 
it gets higher. The disaggregated model is basically identical with the other models. This 
result aligns with the results from the goodness of fit comparison, indicating that the R2adj 
value of the disaggregated model is likely higher in part due to the additional variables. 
But not so much higher that it is noticeably worse when comparing the actual and fitted 
values. 
 
Considering the combined understanding provided by these two analyses, the initial 
prediction is confirmed. The disaggregated model has the best explanatory value of 
economic growth, followed by the multiplicative model, then the statistical-additive 
model, and the intuitive-additive model has the lowest. More practically though, the 
differences between them are negligible. 
 
There are a fair few caveats and limitations to consider when viewing these results. The 
first is a question of reliability in the reconstructed CLI of the intuitive-additive model. It 
was an imperfect recreation and involved some significant guesswork. There was no hope 
of recreating the multi-stage expert opinion aggregation of de Melo et al.’s (1996) original 
CLI, and without any prescription from Havrylyshyn et al.’s (1998) CLI-EBRD indicator 
hybrid it is almost guaranteed that this is an imperfect reconstruction. The overall critique 
regarding consistency between concept structure and measurement still stands, but it is 
possible that there is a more accurate way to recreate the CLI in the original manner that 
is simply not available to the author. 
 
Time has clearly wreaked havoc upon the usefulness and predictive power of structural 
reform indicators and aggregations alike. The results of these panel regressions were 
nowhere near the goodness of fit statistics achieved in earlier examinations. In the original 
formulation of the CLI, it was proposed that there may be a theoretical basis for building 
a decay function into the weighting of the CLI—though at the time there was not an 




observation of the stagnant state of the structural reform indicators, could serve as this 
very basis. 
 
Along with the decline in the power of the CLI and structural reform aggregations, there 
is a rise in the significance of other variables. This is observable through the inclusion of 
FDI in this study, although there are likely others in this context that have not been tested 
for. FDI outperformed the structural reform indicator in all four models, excepting only 
the disaggregated indicator for small-scale privatization. For a variable that was struck 
from earlier models due to lack of significance, this represents a great departure. Again, 
this is likely due in almost equal parts to the declining usefulness of the structural reform 
indicators alongside the increased role of FDI. 
 
The lack of data availability for certain indicators in certain countries was a limitation 
that had a potential impact on the panel regression models. To minimize bias, the goal 
was to have 20 years of data for each country. This was achieved in most cases, but for 
certain countries inflation rates, general government final consumption, or FDI data was 
not available for the earliest one or two years. This resulted in unbalanced panels, where 
these countries were only modeled over 18 or 19 years, while the others were evaluated 
across all 20. For our purposes this was acceptable, as even a period of 18 years is still 
considered a large enough span to minimize bias and missing data entries at the beginning 
of the time span have a minimal effect on the validity of the results (Beck and Katz 2011, 
p. 333). 
 
In the end, these limitations are largely dismissible as it is not the goal or aim of this paper 
to create the best overall model for economic growth. Rather, the effects of different 
aggregations are being tested through embedding them within models of growth that are 
otherwise identical. Technically, we have found that the disaggregated model predicts 
economic growth the best in this situation. But we also found that on a more practical 
level, they all performed very similarly. The implications to be drawn from this are not at 
all related to the practical use of aggregations, but rather to following the thread back 
through the models, past the measurement, and back to the concept structuring. By 




models has been influenced. None of the data was changed, and none of the other model 
variables or methods were changed. All that changed was the concept structuring and the 
associated measurements. 
 
Of the three aggregated models, the multiplicative performed the best by a slim margin. 
An economist who believes that each component of structural reforms is necessary and 
sufficient for a country to be considered highly reformed might feel vindicated by this 
result, as it proves that their conceptualization was correct. They would, of course, be 
wrong. Higher predictive power or significance does not equate to theoretical correctness. 
Concept structuring cannot be influenced by the eventual outcome—the opposite must be 
true. Causality in this situation flows out of the concept structuring. Because there is 
theoretical justification based on certain observable or conjecturable characteristics about 
the very nature of the concept or relationships within it, that then could imply a specific 
type of measurement that must be used—this measurement having its own, unique impact 
on any results. This is a situation vulnerable to abuse, whether it is intentional or 
unintentional. 
 
A researcher might try some different methods of aggregation of structural reforms and 
find that the multiplicative performs best and thus, should be used in their model. This a 
posteriori justification is ignorant to the importance of clearly structured concepts. The 
researcher might not care or understand that a multiplicative measure necessitates that the 
aggregation takes on a necessary and sufficient conditionality. If this model is then used 
to assess determinants of growth in transition countries and the structural reforms 
component is found to be highly significant, then there could be actual policy implications 
to that unintentionally incorrect, a posteriori justification. Policymakers might use the 
results of this model to determine which policy objectives to focus on. If the model makes 
the conceptual assertion that each component of the structural reforms aggregation is 
necessary and sufficient, then policymakers may take that at face value. This same 
scenario could play out in a more sinister fashion, where an actor with a specific agenda 
could intentionally use a multiplicative model even if they are conceptually aware it is 
not the most fitting. Thus, they can misrepresent the concept structure to purposefully 





The analysis of the disaggregated model reveals some even more opportunities for abuse 
of aggregations to color perceptions of the results. The first and most obvious in this case 
is to use an aggregation like the cumulative liberalization index to obscure the variations 
within the more specific indicators. A liberalization proponent might see the results of the 
disaggregated model in this study as unfortunate and possibly a bit threatening. Only one 
of the liberalization indicators has a positive effect on growth, and only three are at all 
significant. An easy way to obscure this is to aggregate the indicators such that the 
negative effects are offset by the positive ones. If given enough weighting, small scale 
privatization turns a result of one positive and 5 negative relationships into a single 
positive relationship. This would promote liberalization as a whole, rather than indicating 
to policymakers that there are certain liberalizing policies that may work better than 
others. This represents the intentional side of abuse in the case of aggregation, but again, 
there is also room for unintentional abuse. To aggregate simply for the sake of 
“stylization,” or descriptive purposes can result in the same obscuring of the data without 
even realizing it. This should not be interpreted as: one must always have a statistical 
justification for aggregation. Descriptive aggregations can be perfectly fine—if they are 
conceptualized and justified appropriately. In fact, de Melo et al.’s (1996) original CLI 
was a good example of this, at least until the issues of concept structuring arise. But the 
justification for descriptive aggregation of the CLI was theoretically sound. Without this 
justification, then there is danger in losing variation and information about specific 
indicators simply through carelessness. 
 
The results of the analysis seem rather unremarkable at first glance—all the tested models 
predict growth in very similar ways. However, this serves to set the scene for then 
analyzing implications thereof. If all the models are mathematically relevant in the same 
way, why use one over the other? The first answer is, of course, because a particular 
aggregation or non-aggregation is what is demanded by the established concept 
structuring. But they also involve different implications in the result phase. If the 
cohesiveness of the concept structure, measurement, and analysis is well-planned, then 





Substantively, what we can learn from these four models—and especially the 
disaggregated model—is that perhaps there is a deeper problem with the construct validity 
of structural reforms. The significance of the structural reform aggregation in each model 
using an aggregation is consistently the lowest among the independent variables. The 
aforementioned problems with time certainly contribute to this, but we can also see from 
the disaggregated model that there is still some explanatory power left within the 
indicators; it is concentrated mainly in small scale privatization, with large scale 
privatization and trade and foreign exchange system liberalization being the only other 
indicators with any significance. All of this is to suggest: What if there is no special 
meaning or significance to liberalizing structural reforms? What if, as a construct, it is 
largely irrelevant to economic growth? 
 
If we concede that most of the explanatory power coming from a structural reforms index 
(or set of indicators) is coming from indicators of privatization, then that is likely not 
measuring and representative of liberalizing structural reforms. Privatization, being the 
transfer of ownership from public to private, is almost a pure measurement of 
capitalism—either level of or possibly commitment to. In this function, large- and small-
scale privatization seem to have captured all the necessary effects of structural changes 
that come along with a transition to a market economy. Taken alongside the increased 
explanatory power of FDI, a new, simplified model can be determined. An increasingly 
committed capitalist economy that has a higher level of support from external market 
actors will lead to more growth. Coupling this with the more obvious indicators of 
stabilization and size of government, a model can be specified that has higher explanatory 
power than any of the aggregate models, nearly the same explanatory power of the 
disaggregated model, and a simpler, more direct message on the determinants of growth. 
The resultant statistic from this model, which will be referred to as the proposed model, 









Table 4.4 Statistical results of the proposed model fixed-effects panel regression 
 
 Dependent Variable 




















Years 18-20 (unbalanced panel) 
Observations 470 
R2 0.33878 
Adjusted R2 0.2952 
F statistic 37.573 (df = 6; 440) 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.0; p-values are listed in parentheses below coefficient estimates 
Source: See Section 3.2 for the source of each variable; Author’s data 
 
Where this explanation breaks down might be in the relationship between large-scale 
privatization and growth, which is negative. So, not all moves towards a market economy 
are equally advantageous to growth. Perhaps a more accurate description of this 
simplified model would be: A considered commitment to a capitalist economy starting at 
the lowest levels of enterprise, along with higher levels of support from external market 
actors, macroeconomic stabilization, and controlling the size of the government will lead 
to more growth.  
 
With this, the special importance of liberalizing reforms is excluded from models of 
growth. Reforms are only important insofar as they indicate a move towards a market 
economy, indicating openness to investors (measured through FDI) and done within a 




rate and government expenditures, respectively). This is a direct blow to the construct 
validity of structural reforms in growth models of transition economies. While there was 
certainly reason to examine this aggregation initially, continued study of it indicates that 
it may only be partially conceptually useful—and the parts that are useful really should 
be conceptually structured in a way that does not indicate structural reforms as such. 
Another way to think of this may be as follows: it is not the liberalization that impacts 
growth, but rather the message sent through the act of liberalizing. For this simple 
message, privatization indicators are fully capable of capturing the impact. 
 
The cumulative liberalization index and the concept of structural reforms are best left as 
a product of their time when liberalization was thought to be of the utmost importance 
and synonymous with movement towards a market economy. In critically examining the 
validity of such constructs, there is plenty of evidence to indicate that variation and 
explanation can be lost in aggregation. This suggests that at the very least no aggregative 
measures can improve on the explanation of the disaggregated measures. Further, by 
evaluating the results of this study more substantively, the very nature of a structural 
reforms construct is found to be flawed. If the historical relevance and use of such a 
construct is disregarded, there are better, simpler ways to explain and characterize growth 






By testing four different models of economic growth in transition countries differentiated 
by the method of aggregation used to represent structural reforms, we can conclude that 
the precise method does not affect the predictive power to any great degree of 
significance. However, what this study has enabled us to observe is the connection 
between concept structuring and the interpretation of results. This is something that may 
often be overlooked in the use of aggregations and indices—especially those issuing forth 
from large and trustworthy institutions. 
 
The lack of differentiation of predictive power is a potential mathematical reason to write 
off the use of other conceptual structures in favor of the one chosen by a researcher. If it 
does not affect the output of a model, then it may seem as if there is no reason to consider 
each as better or worse. But we have shown that different conceptual structures can 
influence the interpretation of results. In some cases, this could be used malevolently to 
push certain agendas or hide results that might negatively affect a message. In other cases, 
it can be a simple error on the part of researchers who fail to accurately detail the concept 
they are examining. In either case, though, the validity of the results is diminished. The 
development and continued use of the CLI falls firmly into the latter category. Very much 
a product of its time, those creating the CLI were most probably too wrapped up in the 
fervor of liberalization to even consider these important—though admittedly, quite 
densely theoretical—questions of concept structuring and construct validity. 
 
In the case of this study, perhaps the most revealing portion was the examination and 
results of the disaggregated model. The very inclusion of the disaggregated model for 
examination points to the author’s own intuitive curiosity of the aggregation of structural 
reforms; that being, there is a very distinct possibility that besides a general, categorical 
connection, these indicators are all representative of distinct concepts that could have very 
different effects and significance in the context of an economic growth model. The results 
of the study confirm that this understanding was accurate as it was not liberalizing 
structural reforms as an aggregate impacting growth, but rather a smaller subset of certain 
liberalizing reforms—most notably, small-scale privatization. With no intention of falling 




disaggregating the indicators is necessarily a superior conceptualization. It is simply a 
result that shows different interpretations and vastly different policy applications of the 
results based on the chosen conceptual structuring and subsequently implied method of 
measurement. If there are clear conceptual or even statistical reasons to keep these 
variables aggregated, then the disaggregated results should not be considered. In absence 
of these reasons, there is evidence to contend that a disaggregated conceptualization and 
measurement is, at present, the best way to include these policy indicators in models of 
economic growth in transition countries. An examination more based in economic theory 
could provide a more definitive answer regarding the most appropriate conceptual 
structure of structural reforms in transition economies than this practical examination. 
But this study could serve as the impetus for such future examination. 
 
The passage of time has also not proven kind to the application of measures of liberalizing 
structural reforms—a measure which is, by its nature, sensitive to time—in any 
configuration or aggregation. The idea of policy variables in growth models is still quite 
intriguing though, especially in the context of transition countries. Thus, another avenue 
for further study would be a broader search for more relevant policy variables that could 
better explain economic growth over a longer period of time or better explain the dynamic 
nature of these variables. 
 
Finally, by using the substantive results of this examination, it is possible to propose a 
new model that does away with the concept of structural reforms entirely. By replacing 
the concept of liberalizing structural reforms with a simpler idea of commitment to a 
market economy and using only indicators of privatization, a model with nearly 
equivalent explanatory power can be determined. This is a result that strikes at the very 
heart of the construct validity of structural reforms. Going forward, it would make more 
sense to use different indicators or aggregations to capture the explanatory power of 
concepts that aggregations such as the CLI were only capturing partially. 
 
In many ways, this study could be characterized as a cautionary tale to researchers and 
their audiences. It is an esoteric contribution to the idea of data literacy, past the more 




would question the foundational validity of a widely used, IMF developed index. Even in 
the preliminary stages of this paper, a comprehensive evaluation of the CLI was not the 
target or method of examination. It is simply something that is overwhelmingly accepted 
as valid. By examining it critically, it was possible to determine that some unassuming 
changes to the concept structure can lead to major differences in the interpretation of 
results even without changing the underlying data or method of analysis. These 
interpretations have a further impact on the application of these indicators, aggregations, 
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Albania 1994 8.30 1 3 2 3 4 2 35.84 14.62 2.82 2.9 
Albania 1995 13.32 2 4 2 3 4 2 9.97 13.83 2.93 3.1 
Albania 1996 9.10 2 4 2 3 4 2 38.17 9.45 2.82 3.1 
Albania 1997 -10.92 2 4 2 3 4 2 11.24 10.45 2.10 3.1 
Albania 1998 8.83 2 4 2 3 4 2 6.73 10.84 1.77 3.1 
Albania 1999 12.89 2 4 2 3 4 2 2.10 11.06 1.28 3.1 
Albania 2000 6.95 2 4 2 3 4 2 5.64 9.69 4.11 3.1 
Albania 2001 8.29 2 4 2 3 4 2 3.81 10.63 5.29 3.1 
Albania 2002 4.54 2 4 2 3 4 2 3.64 11.34 3.10 3.1 
Albania 2003 5.53 2 4 2 4 4 2 5.20 11.10 3.17 3.4 
Albania 2004 5.51 2 4 2 4 4 3 3.16 11.21 4.75 3.5 
Albania 2005 5.53 3 4 2 4 4 3 3.30 11.03 3.26 3.6 
Albania 2006 5.90 3 4 2 4 4 3 2.48 10.53 3.65 3.6 
Albania 2007 5.98 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.39 10.48 6.11 3.6 
Albania 2008 7.50 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.12 10.38 9.68 3.6 
Albania 2009 3.35 4 4 2 4 4 3 2.42 11.11 11.17 3.7 
Albania 2010 3.71 4 4 2 4 4 3 4.49 11.16 9.14 3.7 
Albania 2011 2.55 4 4 2 4 4 3 2.31 10.97 8.14 3.7 
Albania 2012 1.42 4 4 2 4 4 3 1.04 10.84 7.45 3.7 
Albania 2013 1.00 4 4 2 4 4 3 0.29 11.03 9.82 3.7 
Albania 2014 1.77 4 4 2 4 4 3 1.55 11.45 8.69 3.7 
Armenia 1994 5.40 1 3 1 3 2 1 4107.30 11.54 0.61 2.1 
Armenia 1995 6.90 2 3 2 3 3 2 161.16 11.32 1.72 2.7 
Armenia 1996 5.87 3 3 2 3 4 2 19.59 11.34 1.10 3.1 
Armenia 1997 3.32 3 3 2 3 4 2 17.74 11.48 3.17 3.1 
Armenia 1998 7.30 3 3 2 3 4 2 10.70 11.29 12.27 3.1 
Armenia 1999 3.30 3 3 2 3 4 2 0.05 12.23 6.61 3.1 
Armenia 2000 5.90 3 3 2 3 4 2 -1.37 10.80 5.45 3.1 
Armenia 2001 9.60 3 4 2 3 4 2 4.03 10.34 3.30 3.2 





Armenia 2003 14.00 3 4 2 4 4 2 4.60 9.38 4.38 3.5 
Armenia 2004 10.50 3 4 2 4 4 2 6.28 9.36 6.91 3.5 
Armenia 2005 13.90 4 4 2 4 4 3 3.21 9.71 5.96 3.7 
Armenia 2006 13.20 4 4 2 4 4 3 4.62 9.27 7.31 3.7 
Armenia 2007 13.70 4 4 2 4 4 3 4.28 9.40 7.25 3.7 
Armenia 2008 6.90 4 4 2 4 4 3 5.99 9.40 8.09 3.7 
Armenia 2009 -14.10 4 4 2 4 4 3 2.50 12.28 8.79 3.7 
Armenia 2010 2.20 4 4 2 4 4 3 7.77 12.04 5.72 3.7 
Armenia 2011 4.70 4 4 2 4 4 2 4.28 11.91 6.44 3.6 
Armenia 2012 7.20 4 4 2 4 4 2 5.35 10.91 4.68 3.6 
Armenia 2013 3.30 4 4 2 4 4 2 3.37 11.94 3.11 3.6 
Armenia 2014 3.60 4 4 2 4 4 2 2.31 12.09 3.50 3.6 
Azerbaijan 1994 -19.70 1 1 1 3 1 1 1386.07 23.51 0.66 1.6 
Azerbaijan 1995 -11.80 1 1 2 3 2 2 545.66 12.79 10.81 2.1 
Azerbaijan 1996 1.30 1 2 2 3 2 2 26.42 12.02 19.75 2.2 
Azerbaijan 1997 5.80 2 3 2 3 2 2 9.24 12.61 28.13 2.4 
Azerbaijan 1998 10.00 2 3 2 3 3 2 -0.97 15.16 23.01 2.7 
Azerbaijan 1999 7.40 2 3 2 3 3 2 2.16 15.61 11.14 2.7 
Azerbaijan 2000 11.10 2 3 2 3 3 2 12.49 15.15 2.46 2.7 
Azerbaijan 2001 9.90 2 3 2 3 3 2 2.52 13.65 14.36 2.7 
Azerbaijan 2002 9.44 2 4 2 3 4 2 4.21 12.40 32.47 3.1 
Azerbaijan 2003 10.21 2 4 2 4 4 2 6.96 12.39 55.08 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2004 9.25 2 4 2 4 4 2 9.25 12.90 54.37 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2005 27.96 2 4 2 4 4 2 14.72 10.42 33.80 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2006 34.47 2 4 2 4 4 2 11.33 8.54 21.38 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2007 25.46 2 4 2 4 4 2 20.58 9.66 13.90 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2008 10.59 2 4 2 4 4 2 27.97 8.50 8.16 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2009 9.37 2 4 2 4 4 2 -18.90 11.12 6.55 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2010 4.79 2 4 2 4 4 2 13.83 10.88 6.34 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2011 -1.57 2 4 2 4 4 2 24.61 10.13 6.80 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2012 2.20 2 4 2 4 4 2 2.84 10.53 7.60 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2013 5.84 2 4 2 4 4 2 0.41 10.28 3.53 3.4 
Azerbaijan 2014 2.80 2 4 2 4 4 2 -1.33 10.89 5.89 3.4 
Belarus 1994 -11.70 2 2 2 2 1 1 1945.75 20.51 0.07 1.6 
Belarus 1995 -10.40 2 2 2 3 2 2 661.50 20.55 0.11 2.3 
Belarus 1996 2.80 1 2 2 3 2 1 53.71 20.55 0.71 2.1 
Belarus 1997 11.40 1 2 1 3 1 1 71.65 20.32 2.49 1.7 
Belarus 1998 8.40 1 2 1 2 1 1 76.58 19.86 1.33 1.4 
Belarus 1999 3.40 1 2 1 2 1 1 316.79 19.50 3.66 1.4 
Belarus 2000 5.80 1 2 1 2 2 1 185.29 19.48 0.93 1.7 
Belarus 2001 4.73 1 2 1 2 2 1 79.53 21.55 0.78 1.7 
Belarus 2002 5.05 1 2 1 2 2 2 44.89 21.03 1.69 1.8 
Belarus 2003 7.04 1 2 1 3 2 2 30.69 21.38 0.96 2.1 





Belarus 2005 9.40 1 2 1 3 2 2 18.97 20.79 1.01 2.1 
Belarus 2006 10.00 1 2 1 3 2 2 10.75 19.21 0.97 2.1 
Belarus 2007 8.60 1 2 1 3 2 2 12.87 18.52 3.99 2.1 
Belarus 2008 10.20 2 2 2 3 2 2 21.21 16.52 3.60 2.3 
Belarus 2009 0.20 2 2 2 3 2 2 9.26 16.10 3.69 2.3 
Belarus 2010 7.80 2 2 2 3 2 2 11.29 16.02 2.44 2.3 
Belarus 2011 5.38 2 2 2 3 2 2 71.04 13.45 6.48 2.3 
Belarus 2012 1.69 2 2 2 3 2 2 75.28 13.57 2.23 2.3 
Belarus 2013 1.00 2 2 2 3 2 2 21.26 13.43 2.97 2.3 
Belarus 2014 1.73 2 2 2 3 2 2 18.11 13.75 2.36 2.3 
Bulgaria 1994 1.82 2 2 2 3 4 2 72.70 17.19 1.09 2.9 
Bulgaria 1995 2.86 2 3 2 3 4 2 135.97 15.35 0.48 3 
Bulgaria 1996 5.14 2 3 2 2 4 2 63.07 13.85 0.89 2.7 
Bulgaria 1997 -14.19 3 3 2 3 4 3 914.13 12.14 4.46 3.2 
Bulgaria 1998 4.29 3 3 2 3 4 3 33.31 18.35 3.57 3.2 
Bulgaria 1999 -8.28 3 3 2 3 4 3 3.19 19.61 6.01 3.2 
Bulgaria 2000 4.78 4 4 2 3 4 3 7.18 19.79 7.56 3.4 
Bulgaria 2001 3.82 4 4 2 3 4 3 6.12 19.37 5.73 3.4 
Bulgaria 2002 5.95 4 4 2 3 4 3 3.77 19.18 5.52 3.4 
Bulgaria 2003 5.15 4 4 3 4 4 3 2.27 20.11 9.92 3.8 
Bulgaria 2004 6.44 4 4 3 4 4 4 5.65 19.36 11.75 3.9 
Bulgaria 2005 7.15 4 4 3 4 4 4 6.50 18.15 13.72 3.9 
Bulgaria 2006 6.80 4 4 3 4 4 4 6.76 18.15 22.90 3.9 
Bulgaria 2007 6.56 4 4 3 4 4 4 11.08 16.70 31.25 3.9 
Bulgaria 2008 6.09 4 4 3 4 4 4 8.13 17.16 18.91 3.9 
Bulgaria 2009 -3.37 4 4 3 4 4 4 4.05 16.74 7.49 3.9 
Bulgaria 2010 0.56 4 4 3 4 4 4 1.15 16.60 3.66 3.9 
Bulgaria 2011 2.35 4 4 3 4 4 3 5.94 15.93 3.67 3.8 
Bulgaria 2012 0.36 4 4 3 4 4 3 1.53 15.87 3.31 3.8 
Bulgaria 2013 0.33 4 4 3 4 4 3 -0.67 17.14 3.58 3.8 
Bulgaria 2014 1.89 4 4 3 4 4 3 0.46 16.89 1.92 3.8 
Croatia 1994  3 4 2 3 4 3    3.3 
Croatia 1995  3 4 2 3 4 3  24.91 0.48 3.3 
Croatia 1996 5.91 3 4 3 3 4 3 3.81 22.44 2.07 3.4 
Croatia 1997 6.20 3 4 3 3 4 3 6.85 21.72 2.50 3.4 
Croatia 1998 2.29 3 4 3 3 4 3 8.14 22.68 3.93 3.4 
Croatia 1999 -0.95 3 4 3 3 4 3 3.54 23.55 6.20 3.4 
Croatia 2000 2.86 3 4 3 3 4 3 4.36 21.55 4.69 3.4 
Croatia 2001 2.96 3 4 3 3 4 3 4.31 19.43 4.50 3.4 
Croatia 2002 5.68 3 4 3 3 4 4 3.86 19.12 3.66 3.5 
Croatia 2003 5.64 3 4 3 4 4 4 4.30 18.55 5.32 3.8 
Croatia 2004 4.15 3 4 3 4 4 4 3.61 18.60 3.16 3.8 
Croatia 2005 4.31 3 4 3 4 4 4 3.13 18.49 4.00 3.8 





Croatia 2007 5.07 3 4 3 4 4 4 4.20 19.24 7.73 3.8 
Croatia 2008 1.89 3 4 3 4 4 4 5.56 18.81 7.47 3.8 
Croatia 2009 -7.32 3 4 3 4 4 4 2.97 20.65 4.90 3.8 
Croatia 2010 -1.32 3 4 3 4 4 4 0.92 20.61 2.58 3.8 
Croatia 2011 -0.20 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.65 20.74 2.00 3.7 
Croatia 2012 -2.39 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.48 20.74 2.59 3.7 
Croatia 2013 -0.45 4 4 3 4 4 3 0.75 20.52 1.61 3.8 
Croatia 2014 -0.34 4 4 3 4 4 3 0.14 20.92 5.52 3.8 
Estonia 1994 -1.64 3 4 3 3 4 3 39.67 23.30 5.31 3.4 
Estonia 1995 4.53 4 4 3 3 4 3 31.46 24.60 4.60 3.5 
Estonia 1996 4.94 4 4 3 3 4 3 22.54 22.64 3.47 3.5 
Estonia 1997 13.05 4 4 3 3 4 3 9.92 20.43 5.32 3.5 
Estonia 1998 4.33 4 4 3 3 4 3 6.89 20.73 10.51 3.5 
Estonia 1999 -0.40 4 4 3 3 4 4 6.69 22.12 5.66 3.6 
Estonia 2000 10.11 4 4 3 3 4 4 3.71 19.75 7.31 3.6 
Estonia 2001 5.98 4 4 3 3 4 4 6.76 18.80 9.47 3.6 
Estonia 2002 6.80 4 4 3 3 4 4 4.81 18.30 4.59 3.6 
Estonia 2003 7.57 4 4 3 4 4 4 3.90 17.98 10.51 3.9 
Estonia 2004 6.77 4 4 3 4 4 4 4.67 17.50 8.95 3.9 
Estonia 2005 9.49 4 4 4 4 4 4 5.91 16.96 21.69 4 
Estonia 2006 9.72 4 4 4 4 4 4 9.02 15.99 10.33 4 
Estonia 2007 7.57 4 4 4 4 4 4 12.42 16.09 13.51 4 
Estonia 2008 -5.09 4 4 4 4 4 4 6.90 18.69 8.11 4 
Estonia 2009 -14.43 4 4 4 4 4 4 -0.18 21.11 9.45 4 
Estonia 2010 2.69 4 4 4 4 4 4 1.83 20.07 13.16 4 
Estonia 2011 7.44 4 4 4 4 4 4 5.39 18.74 4.78 4 
Estonia 2012 3.12 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.02 18.52 7.71 4 
Estonia 2013 1.35 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.04 18.99 4.34 4 
Estonia 2014 2.99 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.95 19.09 6.65 4 
Georgia 1994 -10.40 1 2 1 2 1 1 6041.59 9.83 0.32 1.4 
Georgia 1995 2.60 2 3 2 3 2 2 162.73 10.91  2.4 
Georgia 1996 11.20 3 4 2 3 3 2 43.03 7.70  2.9 
Georgia 1997 10.52 3 4 2 3 4 2 6.54 10.17 6.91 3.2 
Georgia 1998 3.10 3 4 2 3 4 2 6.94 11.08 7.34 3.2 
Georgia 1999 2.87 3 4 2 3 4 2 9.73 10.63 2.94 3.2 
Georgia 2000 1.84 3 4 2 3 4 2 4.68 8.54 4.30 3.2 
Georgia 2001 4.81 3 4 2 3 4 2 5.38 9.64 3.41 3.2 
Georgia 2002 5.47 3 4 2 3 4 2 5.92 9.79 4.72 3.2 
Georgia 2003 11.06 3 4 2 4 4 2 3.42 8.12 8.39 3.5 
Georgia 2004 5.79 3 4 2 4 4 3 8.43 11.43 9.61 3.6 
Georgia 2005 9.59 4 4 2 4 4 3 7.94 14.38 7.07 3.7 
Georgia 2006 9.42 4 4 2 4 4 3 8.45 12.01 15.12 3.7 
Georgia 2007 12.58 4 4 2 4 4 3 9.46 16.50 18.60 3.7 





Georgia 2009 -3.65 4 4 2 4 4 3 -2.14 18.52 6.14 3.7 
Georgia 2010 6.25 4 4 2 4 4 3 14.19 15.27 7.52 3.7 
Georgia 2011 7.40 4 4 2 4 4 3 8.71 13.73 7.75 3.7 
Georgia 2012 6.37 4 4 2 4 4 3 0.46 13.62 5.87 3.7 
Georgia 2013 3.62 4 4 2 4 4 3 1.35 14.02 6.09 3.7 
Georgia 2014 4.43 4 4 2 4 4 3 4.23 14.27 10.42 3.7 
Hungary 1994 2.95 3 4 3 3 4 3 19.49 25.47 2.65 3.4 
Hungary 1995 1.49 4 4 3 3 4 3 26.73 22.87 10.35 3.5 
Hungary 1996 0.08 4 4 3 3 4 3 21.93 21.63 7.05 3.5 
Hungary 1997 3.14 4 4 3 3 4 4 20.26 21.26 8.80 3.6 
Hungary 1998 3.90 4 4 3 3 4 4 13.77 20.92 6.70 3.6 
Hungary 1999 3.07 4 4 3 3 4 4 8.12 21.26 6.90 3.6 
Hungary 2000 4.48 4 4 3 3 4 4 9.58 21.20 5.82 3.6 
Hungary 2001 4.07 4 4 3 3 4 4 11.05 21.08 7.55 3.6 
Hungary 2002 4.74 4 4 3 3 4 4 8.09 21.86 5.39 3.6 
Hungary 2003 4.08 4 4 3 4 4 4 5.44 23.01 4.87 3.9 
Hungary 2004 4.82 4 4 3 4 4 4 5.09 22.06 4.37 3.9 
Hungary 2005 4.24 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.63 22.17 24.33 4 
Hungary 2006 4.03 4 4 4 4 4 4 3.66 22.02 16.16 4 
Hungary 2007 0.24 4 4 4 4 4 4 5.44 20.81 50.46 4 
Hungary 2008 1.06 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.79 21.40 47.50 4 
Hungary 2009 -6.70 4 4 4 4 4 4 4.19 22.07 -2.14 4 
Hungary 2010 1.12 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.53 21.44 
-
15.75 4 
Hungary 2011 1.94 4 4 4 4 4 3 1.93 20.62 7.58 3.9 
Hungary 2012 -1.38 4 4 4 4 4 3 2.89 20.01 8.42 3.9 
Hungary 2013 1.86 4 4 4 4 4 3 2.83 19.76 -2.65 3.9 
Hungary 2014 4.23 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.71 20.03 9.28 3.9 
Kazakstan 1994 -12.60 2 2 1 2 2 1 1546.73 10.68 3.10 1.8 
Kazakstan 1995 -8.20 2 2 1 3 3 2 160.89 13.58 4.73 2.5 
Kazakstan 1996 0.50 3 3 2 3 4 2 38.90 12.91 5.41 3.1 
Kazakstan 1997 1.70 3 3 2 3 4 2 16.14 12.38 5.96 3.1 
Kazakstan 1998 -1.90 3 4 2 3 4 2 5.66 10.78 5.20 3.2 
Kazakstan 1999 2.70 3 4 2 3 3 2 13.28 11.54 9.41 2.9 
Kazakstan 2000 9.80 3 4 2 3 3 2 17.43 12.08 7.49 2.9 
Kazakstan 2001 13.50 3 4 2 3 3 3 10.16 13.41 12.72 3 
Kazakstan 2002 9.80 3 4 2 3 3 3 5.80 11.61 10.51 3 
Kazakstan 2003 9.30 3 4 2 4 3 3 11.74 11.26 8.05 3.3 
Kazakstan 2004 9.60 3 4 2 4 3 3 16.13 11.61 13.01 3.3 
Kazakstan 2005 9.70 3 4 2 4 3 3 17.87 11.25 4.46 3.3 
Kazakstan 2006 10.70 3 4 2 4 4 3 21.55 10.18 9.40 3.6 
Kazakstan 2007 8.90 3 4 2 4 4 3 15.53 11.05 11.42 3.6 
Kazakstan 2008 3.30 3 4 2 4 4 3 20.94 10.19 12.60 3.6 
Kazakstan 2009 1.20 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.69 11.66 12.38 3.6 





Kazakstan 2011 7.40 3 4 2 4 4 3 20.54 10.48 7.14 3.6 
Kazakstan 2012 4.80 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.79 11.52 6.56 3.6 
Kazakstan 2013 6.00 3 4 2 4 4 3 9.50 10.17 4.23 3.6 
Kazakstan 2014 4.20 3 4 2 4 4 2 5.77 10.69 3.30 3.5 
Krgyz Republic 1994 -20.09 3 4 2 3 3 2 180.87 18.90 2.27 2.9 
Krgyz Republic 1995 -5.42 4 4 2 3 4 2 42.03 19.54 5.79 3.3 
Krgyz Republic 1996 7.08 3 4 2 3 4 2 35.34 18.52 2.58 3.2 
Krgyz Republic 1997 9.92 3 4 2 3 4 3 19.31 17.30 4.74 3.3 
Krgyz Republic 1998 2.12 3 4 2 3 4 3 9.08 17.85 6.64 3.3 
Krgyz Republic 1999 3.66 3 4 2 3 4 2 37.57 19.12 3.56 3.2 
Krgyz Republic 2000 5.44 3 4 2 3 4 2 27.16 20.04 -0.17 3.2 
Krgyz Republic 2001 5.32 3 4 2 3 4 2 7.33 17.48 0.33 3.2 
Krgyz Republic 2002 -0.02 3 4 2 3 4 2 2.03 18.62 0.29 3.2 
Krgyz Republic 2003 7.03 3 4 2 4 4 2 3.97 16.83 2.37 3.5 
Krgyz Republic 2004 7.03 4 4 2 4 4 2 5.11 18.17 7.93 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2005 -0.18 4 4 2 4 4 2 7.13 17.51 1.73 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2006 3.10 4 4 2 4 4 2 9.39 17.99 6.42 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2007 8.54 4 4 2 4 4 2 14.88 17.10 5.47 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2008 8.40 4 4 2 4 4 2 22.22 17.52 7.33 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2009 2.89 4 4 2 4 4 2 4.04 18.43 4.04 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2010 -0.47 4 4 2 4 4 2 10.03 18.13 9.86 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2011 5.96 4 4 2 4 4 2 22.48 18.23 11.06 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2012 -0.09 4 4 2 4 4 2 8.66 20.11 3.95 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2013 10.92 4 4 2 4 4 2 3.18 18.45 8.34 3.6 
Krgyz Republic 2014 4.02 4 4 2 4 4 2 8.42 17.47 4.59 3.6 
Latvia 1994  2 3 2 3 4 3    3.1 
Latvia 1995  2 4 2 3 4 3  23.56 4.22 3.2 
Latvia 1996 2.57 3 4 3 3 4 3 12.40 21.97 5.55 3.4 
Latvia 1997 8.86 3 4 3 3 4 3 5.87 21.04 7.27 3.4 
Latvia 1998 6.34 3 4 3 3 4 3 4.82 22.65 5.19 3.4 
Latvia 1999 2.74 3 4 3 3 4 3 1.49 22.57 4.63 3.4 
Latvia 2000 5.67 3 4 3 3 4 3 3.61 20.91 4.08 3.4 
Latvia 2001 6.32 3 4 3 3 4 3 2.29 20.57 2.08 3.4 
Latvia 2002 7.08 3 4 3 3 4 4 5.09 20.65 1.68 3.5 
Latvia 2003 8.43 3 4 3 4 4 4 4.94 21.14 2.70 3.8 
Latvia 2004 8.50 4 4 3 4 4 4 6.80 19.86 4.11 3.9 
Latvia 2005 10.73 4 4 3 4 4 4 11.17 17.73 4.78 3.9 
Latvia 2006 11.99 4 4 3 4 4 4 12.44 17.11 7.93 3.9 
Latvia 2007 10.03 4 4 3 4 4 4 20.07 17.49 8.75 3.9 
Latvia 2008 -3.33 4 4 3 4 4 4 11.62 19.60 4.01 3.9 
Latvia 2009 -14.26 4 4 3 4 4 4 -9.73 18.90 -0.57 3.9 
Latvia 2010 -4.41 4 4 3 4 4 4 -0.42 18.27 1.99 3.9 
Latvia 2011 6.47 4 4 3 4 4 3 6.37 18.07 5.31 3.8 





Latvia 2013 2.31 4 4 3 4 4 3 1.64 17.53 3.25 3.8 
Latvia 2014 1.07 4 4 3 4 4 3 1.92 17.78 3.34 3.8 
Lithuania 1994  3 4 2 3 4 2    3.2 
Lithuania 1995  3 4 2 3 4 3  24.00 0.92 3.3 
Lithuania 1996 5.16 3 4 3 3 4 3 18.99 24.08 1.82 3.4 
Lithuania 1997 8.31 3 4 3 3 4 3 11.45 24.16 3.58 3.4 
Lithuania 1998 7.48 3 4 3 3 4 3 3.35 25.88 8.17 3.4 
Lithuania 1999 -1.14 3 4 3 3 4 3 -1.26 23.67 5.15 3.4 
Lithuania 2000 3.70 3 4 3 3 4 3 1.30 22.43 3.30 3.4 
Lithuania 2001 6.53 3 4 3 3 4 3 -0.32 21.17 3.62 3.4 
Lithuania 2002 6.75 4 4 3 3 4 3 0.32 20.59 4.63 3.5 
Lithuania 2003 10.57 4 4 3 4 4 3 -0.81 19.57 1.16 3.8 
Lithuania 2004 6.57 4 4 3 4 4 3 2.68 19.19 3.89 3.8 
Lithuania 2005 7.73 4 4 3 4 4 4 6.89 18.52 4.95 3.9 
Lithuania 2006 7.41 4 4 3 4 4 4 6.74 19.15 7.49 3.9 
Lithuania 2007 11.11 4 4 3 4 4 4 8.55 17.47 6.55 3.9 
Lithuania 2008 2.61 4 4 3 4 4 4 9.71 18.68 3.61 3.9 
Lithuania 2009 -14.84 4 4 3 4 4 4 -3.30 21.27 -0.96 3.9 
Lithuania 2010 1.65 4 4 3 4 4 4 2.53 19.84 2.97 3.9 
Lithuania 2011 6.04 4 4 3 4 4 3 5.35 18.32 4.32 3.8 
Lithuania 2012 3.84 4 4 3 4 4 3 2.73 17.45 1.58 3.8 
Lithuania 2013 3.55 4 4 3 4 4 3 1.28 16.66 1.65 3.8 
Lithuania 2014 3.54 4 4 3 4 4 3 0.83 16.61 0.74 3.8 
Moldova 1994  2 2 2 3 2 2    2.3 
Moldova 1995  3 3 2 3 4 2  25.90 3.82 3.1 
Moldova 1996 -5.88 3 3 2 3 4 2 27.85 25.97 1.40 3.1 
Moldova 1997 1.65 3 3 2 3 4 2 12.50 28.81 4.08 3.1 
Moldova 1998 -6.54 3 3 2 3 4 2 9.46 24.71 4.45 3.1 
Moldova 1999 -3.37 3 3 2 3 4 2 39.78 15.32 3.23 3.1 
Moldova 2000 2.11 3 3 2 3 4 2 27.33 14.66 9.90 3.1 
Moldova 2001 6.10 3 3 2 3 4 2 12.09 14.36 6.99 3.1 
Moldova 2002 7.80 3 3 2 3 4 2 9.83 20.23 5.06 3.1 
Moldova 2003 6.60 3 3 2 4 4 2 14.87 19.68 3.72 3.4 
Moldova 2004 7.40 3 3 2 4 4 3 7.99 14.90 5.81 3.5 
Moldova 2005 7.50 3 3 2 4 4 3 9.34 16.44 6.38 3.5 
Moldova 2006 4.80 3 4 2 4 4 3 13.42 19.99 7.59 3.6 
Moldova 2007 3.00 3 3 2 4 4 3 15.91 19.95 12.18 3.5 
Moldova 2008 7.80 3 4 2 4 4 3 9.24 20.41 12.00 3.6 
Moldova 2009 -6.00 3 4 2 4 4 3 2.17 23.76 4.78 3.6 
Moldova 2010 7.10 3 4 2 4 4 3 33.30 18.21 4.16 3.6 
Moldova 2011 5.82 3 4 2 4 4 2 8.19 16.56 4.27 3.5 
Moldova 2012 -0.59 3 4 2 4 4 2 7.42 16.69 2.88 3.5 
Moldova 2013 9.04 3 4 2 4 4 2 3.92 15.31 2.55 3.5 






Macedonia 1994 -1.76 2 4 2 3 4 2 151.89 18.10 0.67 3.1 
North 
Macedonia 1995 -1.11 2 4 2 3 4 3 17.09 17.66 0.20 3.2 
North 
Macedonia 1996 1.19 3 4 2 3 4 3 2.86 17.23 0.24 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 1997 1.44 3 4 2 3 4 3 3.93 18.76 0.40 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 1998 3.38 3 4 2 3 4 3 1.39 19.26 4.02 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 1999 4.34 3 4 2 3 4 3 2.74 19.56 2.36 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 2000 4.55 3 4 2 3 4 3 8.18 16.93 5.77 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 2001 -3.07 3 4 2 3 4 3 4.72 23.83 12.66 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 2002 1.49 3 4 2 3 4 3 0.94 20.75 2.84 3.3 
North 
Macedonia 2003 2.22 3 4 2 4 4 3 1.65 18.08 2.41 3.6 
North 
Macedonia 2004 4.67 3 4 2 4 4 3 -0.17 17.41 5.44 3.6 
North 
Macedonia 2005 4.72 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.90 16.18 2.32 3.6 
North 
Macedonia 2006 5.14 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.25 16.51 6.23 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2007 6.47 3 4 3 4 4 3 4.59 16.80 8.80 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2008 5.47 3 4 3 4 4 3 5.49 18.58 6.17 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2009 -0.36 3 4 3 4 4 3 0.30 19.08 2.76 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2010 3.36 3 4 3 4 4 3 2.04 18.29 3.20 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2011 2.34 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.72 18.12 4.84 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2012 -0.46 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.00 18.65 3.47 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2013 2.93 3 4 3 4 4 3 4.48 17.50 3.72 3.7 
North 
Macedonia 2014 3.63 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.45 17.11 0.54 3.7 
Poland 1994 5.29 3 4 3 3 4 3 37.23  1.69 3.4 
Poland 1995 7.10 3 4 3 3 4 3 27.94 18.89 2.57 3.4 
Poland 1996 6.12 3 4 3 3 4 3 17.95 18.51 2.81 3.4 
Poland 1997 6.45 3 4 3 3 4 3 13.67 18.09 3.08 3.4 
Poland 1998 4.64 3 4 3 3 4 3 11.02 17.70 3.65 3.4 
Poland 1999 4.65 3 4 3 3 4 3 6.16 17.88 4.36 3.4 
Poland 2000 4.56 3 4 3 3 4 3 6.12 18.07 5.42 3.4 
Poland 2001 1.26 3 4 3 3 4 3 3.12 18.66 2.97 3.4 
Poland 2002 2.04 3 4 3 3 4 3 1.85 18.64 2.06 3.4 
Poland 2003 3.50 3 4 3 4 4 3 0.78 18.92 2.47 3.7 
Poland 2004 4.98 3 4 3 4 4 3 4.92 18.32 5.44 3.7 





Poland 2006 6.13 3 4 4 4 4 4 1.73 18.54 6.23 3.9 
Poland 2007 7.06 3 4 4 4 4 4 3.72 18.19 5.83 3.9 
Poland 2008 4.20 3 4 4 4 4 4 3.89 18.68 2.73 3.9 
Poland 2009 2.83 3 4 4 4 4 4 3.79 18.75 3.19 3.9 
Poland 2010 3.74 4 4 4 4 4 4 1.65 19.18 3.83 4 
Poland 2011 4.76 4 4 4 4 4 3 3.27 18.14 3.51 3.9 
Poland 2012 1.32 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.36 18.08 1.48 4 
Poland 2013 1.13 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.30 18.33 0.15 4 
Poland 2014 3.38 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.52 18.31 3.65 4 
Romania 1994 3.93 2 3 2 3 4 2 139.02 13.77 1.13 3 
Romania 1995 6.23 2 3 2 3 4 3 43.93 12.25 1.12 3.1 
Romania 1996 3.91 3 3 2 3 3 3 44.00 11.67 0.71 2.9 
Romania 1997 -4.85 3 3 2 3 4 3 135.34 12.69 3.42 3.2 
Romania 1998 -2.03 3 3 2 3 4 2 48.13 11.89 4.87 3.1 
Romania 1999 -0.38 3 4 2 3 4 3 49.52 16.72 2.90 3.3 
Romania 2000 2.46 3 4 2 3 4 3 43.18 16.86 2.78 3.3 
Romania 2001 5.22 3 4 2 3 4 3 37.96 15.80 2.86 3.3 
Romania 2002 5.70 3 4 2 3 4 3 22.71 14.82 2.48 3.3 
Romania 2003 2.34 3 4 2 4 4 3 23.15 16.04 3.19 3.6 
Romania 2004 10.43 4 4 2 4 4 3 15.46 14.73 8.59 3.7 
Romania 2005 4.67 4 4 2 4 4 3 12.01 16.24 6.60 3.7 
Romania 2006 8.03 4 4 3 4 4 3 10.61 15.92 9.02 3.8 
Romania 2007 7.23 4 4 3 4 4 3 15.82 15.39 5.79 3.8 
Romania 2008 9.31 4 4 3 4 4 3 16.02 15.88 6.38 3.8 
Romania 2009 -5.52 4 4 3 4 4 3 4.09 16.10 2.66 3.8 
Romania 2010 -3.90 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.59 15.47 1.93 3.8 
Romania 2011 1.91 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.77 14.27 1.29 3.8 
Romania 2012 2.04 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.77 14.57 1.79 3.8 
Romania 2013 3.77 4 4 3 4 4 3 3.40 14.29 2.02 3.8 
Romania 2014 3.61 4 4 3 4 4 3 1.80 14.50 1.93 3.8 
Russian 
Federation 1994 -12.57 3 3 2 3 3 2 307.30 19.10 0.17 2.8 
Russian 
Federation 1995 -4.14 3 4 2 3 3 2 144.01 19.08 0.52 2.9 
Russian 
Federation 1996 -3.76 3 4 2 3 4 2 46.04 19.49 0.66 3.2 
Russian 
Federation 1997 1.40 3 4 2 3 4 2 15.06 21.07 1.20 3.2 
Russian 
Federation 1998 -5.30 3 4 2 3 2 2 18.54 18.73 1.02 2.6 
Russian 
Federation 1999 6.40 3 4 2 3 2 2 72.39 14.58 1.66 2.6 
Russian 
Federation 2000 10.00 3 4 2 3 2 2 37.70 15.09 1.03 2.6 
Russian 
Federation 2001 5.10 3 4 2 3 3 2 16.48 16.44 0.93 2.9 
Russian 






Federation 2003 7.30 3 4 2 4 3 2 13.66 17.92 1.84 3.2 
Russian 
Federation 2004 7.20 3 4 2 4 3 2 20.26 16.97 2.61 3.2 
Russian 
Federation 2005 6.40 3 4 2 4 3 2 19.28 16.87 2.03 3.2 
Russian 
Federation 2006 8.20 3 4 2 4 3 3 15.12 17.39 3.80 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2007 8.50 3 4 2 4 3 3 13.84 17.30 4.30 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2008 5.20 3 4 2 4 3 3 18.01 17.83 4.50 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2009 -7.80 3 4 2 4 3 3 1.97 20.79 2.99 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2010 4.50 3 4 2 4 3 3 14.19 18.73 2.83 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2011 4.30 3 4 2 4 3 3 24.46 17.63 2.69 3.3 
Russian 
Federation 2012 4.02 3 4 2 4 4 3 8.91 17.97 2.29 3.6 
Russian 
Federation 2013 1.76 3 4 2 4 4 3 5.32 18.68 3.02 3.6 
Russian 
Federation 2014 0.74 3 4 2 4 4 3 7.49 18.03 1.07 3.6 
Slovak Republic 1994 6.21 3 4 3 3 4 3 13.45 24.03 1.34 3.4 
Slovak Republic 1995 5.84 3 4 3 3 4 3 9.89 23.79 0.91 3.4 
Slovak Republic 1996 6.62 3 4 3 3 4 3 4.54 25.30 1.26 3.4 
Slovak Republic 1997 5.93 4 4 3 3 4 3 4.79 22.99 0.64 3.5 
Slovak Republic 1998 4.08 4 4 3 3 4 3 4.85 23.19 2.17 3.5 
Slovak Republic 1999 -0.11 4 4 3 3 4 3 7.22 21.08 1.11 3.5 
Slovak Republic 2000 1.17 4 4 3 3 4 3 9.49 20.74 7.48 3.5 
Slovak Republic 2001 3.25 4 4 3 3 4 3 5.12 20.89 4.98 3.5 
Slovak Republic 2002 4.51 4 4 3 3 4 3 3.94 20.38 11.99 3.5 
Slovak Republic 2003 5.50 4 4 3 4 4 3 5.33 20.71 2.07 3.8 
Slovak Republic 2004 5.28 4 4 3 4 4 4 5.74 18.83 7.09 3.9 
Slovak Republic 2005 6.62 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.54 18.48 6.25 4 
Slovak Republic 2006 8.49 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.90 18.77 8.06 4 
Slovak Republic 2007 10.83 4 4 4 4 4 4 1.12 17.14 5.85 4 
Slovak Republic 2008 5.57 4 4 4 4 4 4 2.86 17.53 4.62 4 
Slovak Republic 2009 -5.46 4 4 4 4 4 4 -1.16 19.99 1.71 4 
Slovak Republic 2010 5.87 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.49 19.36 2.34 4 
Slovak Republic 2011 2.85 4 4 4 4 4 4 1.67 18.44 5.48 4 
Slovak Republic 2012 1.90 4 4 4 4 4 4 1.26 17.84 1.88 4 
Slovak Republic 2013 0.67 4 4 4 4 4 4 0.52 18.09 1.02 4 
Slovak Republic 2014 2.64 4 4 4 4 4 4 -0.19 18.38 -0.36 4 
Slovenia 1994 5.33 2 4 3 3 4 3 22.59 18.98 0.78 3.3 
Slovenia 1995 4.11 3 4 3 3 4 3 25.40 17.82 0.70 3.4 
Slovenia 1996 3.20 3 4 3 3 4 3 11.45 17.72 0.81 3.4 
Slovenia 1997 5.05 3 4 3 3 4 3 8.43 17.65 1.61 3.4 





Slovenia 1999 5.33 3 4 3 3 4 3 6.53 17.80 0.47 3.4 
Slovenia 2000 3.67 3 4 3 3 4 3 5.57 18.46 0.67 3.4 
Slovenia 2001 3.22 3 4 3 3 4 3 8.68 18.83 2.40 3.4 
Slovenia 2002 3.51 3 4 3 3 4 3 7.58 18.66 7.87 3.4 
Slovenia 2003 2.96 3 4 3 4 4 3 5.64 18.77 1.81 3.7 
Slovenia 2004 4.36 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.36 18.83 2.22 3.7 
Slovenia 2005 3.80 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.52 18.91 2.68 3.7 
Slovenia 2006 5.75 3 4 3 4 4 3 2.22 18.65 1.75 3.7 
Slovenia 2007 6.98 3 4 3 4 4 3 4.18 17.45 3.93 3.7 
Slovenia 2008 3.51 3 4 3 4 4 3 4.47 18.16 1.95 3.7 
Slovenia 2009 -7.55 3 4 3 4 4 3 3.40 20.16 -0.69 3.7 
Slovenia 2010 1.34 3 4 3 4 4 3 -1.03 20.42 0.66 3.7 
Slovenia 2011 0.86 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.04 20.56 1.70 3.7 
Slovenia 2012 -2.64 3 4 3 4 4 3 0.48 20.36 0.07 3.7 
Slovenia 2013 -1.03 3 4 3 4 4 3 1.60 19.64 0.21 3.7 
Slovenia 2014 2.77 3 4 3 4 4 3 0.46 18.89 2.04 3.7 
Tajikstan 1994 -21.30 2 2 1 3 1 1 263.01 17.41 0.79 1.8 
Tajikstan 1995 -12.42 2 2 1 3 2 1 294.53 15.81 0.81 2.1 
Tajikstan 1996 -16.70 2 2 1 3 2 1 430.41 16.82 1.72 2.1 
Tajikstan 1997 1.68 2 2 1 3 2 1 65.25 16.51 1.95 2.1 
Tajikstan 1998 5.31 2 2 2 3 3 1 87.88 9.52 2.27 2.5 
Tajikstan 1999 3.70 2 3 2 3 3 1 26.50 9.93 0.62 2.6 
Tajikstan 2000 8.32 2 3 2 3 3 1 22.63 8.29 2.74 2.6 
Tajikstan 2001 9.58 2 4 2 3 3 1 30.95 8.66 0.88 2.7 
Tajikstan 2002 10.84 2 4 2 3 3 2 18.78 8.60 2.95 2.8 
Tajikstan 2003 10.93 2 4 2 4 3 2 27.17 8.26 2.03 3.1 
Tajikstan 2004 10.37 2 4 2 4 3 2 17.36 11.78 13.10 3.1 
Tajikstan 2005 6.64 2 4 2 4 3 2 9.57 14.60 2.36 3.1 
Tajikstan 2006 7.05 2 4 2 4 3 2 21.01 11.10 11.96 3.1 
Tajikstan 2007 7.76 2 4 2 4 3 2 27.29 8.90 9.68 3.1 
Tajikstan 2008 7.91 2 4 2 4 3 2 28.15 9.33 9.43 3.1 
Tajikstan 2009 3.89 2 4 2 4 3 2 12.13 12.46 2.99 3.1 
Tajikstan 2010 6.52 2 4 2 4 3 2 12.44 11.33 1.66 3.1 
Tajikstan 2011 7.40 2 4 2 4 3 2 13.32 13.65 2.24 3.1 
Tajikstan 2012 7.49 2 4 2 4 3 2 11.88 12.84 3.17 3.1 
Tajikstan 2013 7.40 2 4 2 4 4 2 3.63 13.30 3.35 3.4 
Tajikstan 2014 6.71 2 4 2 4 4 2 4.76 14.04 3.58 3.4 
Turkmenistan 1994 -17.30 1 1 1 2 1 1 952.31 8.49 4.02 1.3 
Turkmenistan 1995 -7.20 1 1 1 2 1 1 705.72 11.93 9.39 1.3 
Turkmenistan 1996 6.70 1 1 1 2 1 1 1014.01 7.78 4.54 1.3 
Turkmenistan 1997 -11.40 2 2 2 2 1 1 61.80 17.87 4.40 1.6 
Turkmenistan 1998 7.10 2 2 2 2 1 1 17.62 19.08 2.39 1.6 
Turkmenistan 1999 16.50 2 2 2 2 1 1 23.01 15.46 5.10 1.6 





Turkmenistan 2001 4.34 1 2 1 2 1 1 32.31 14.67 4.81 1.4 
Turkmenistan 2002 0.26 1 2 1 2 1 1 25.15 12.92 6.19 1.4 
Turkmenistan 2003 3.27 1 2 1 3 1 1 27.15 14.01 3.78 1.7 
Turkmenistan 2004 5.00 1 2 1 3 1 1 18.35 13.92 5.17 1.7 
Turkmenistan 2005 13.03 1 2 1 3 1 1 7.03 14.65 5.16 1.7 
Turkmenistan 2006 10.97 1 2 1 3 1 1 12.25 11.71 7.11 1.7 
Turkmenistan 2007 11.06 1 2 1 3 1 1 9.27 9.85 6.76 1.7 
Turkmenistan 2008 14.70 1 2 1 3 2 1 59.74 7.03 6.63 2 
Turkmenistan 2009 6.10 1 2 1 3 2 1 9.76 7.44 22.52 2 
Turkmenistan 2010 9.20 1 2 1 3 2 1 2.31 7.13 16.08 2 
Turkmenistan 2011 14.70 1 2 1 3 2 1 12.86 6.63 11.60 2 
Turkmenistan 2012 11.10 1 2 1 3 2 1 8.27 5.94 8.90 2 
Turkmenistan 2013 10.20 1 2 1 3 2 1 1.15 6.06 7.30 2 
Turkmenistan 2014 10.30 1 2 1 3 2 1 0.67 6.58 8.80 2 
Ukraine 1994 -22.93 1 2 1 2 1 1 953.46 19.36 0.30 1.4 
Ukraine 1995 -12.20 2 2 2 3 3 2 415.81 21.27 0.55 2.6 
Ukraine 1996 -10.00 2 3 2 3 3 2 66.15 21.76 1.17 2.7 
Ukraine 1997 -3.00 2 3 2 3 3 2 18.07 27.40 1.24 2.7 
Ukraine 1998 -1.90 2 3 2 3 3 2 12.01 24.61 1.77 2.7 
Ukraine 1999 -0.20 2 3 2 3 3 2 27.40 19.83 1.57 2.7 
Ukraine 2000 5.90 3 3 2 3 3 2 23.12 20.92 1.90 2.8 
Ukraine 2001 9.20 3 3 2 3 3 2 9.84 18.68 2.09 2.8 
Ukraine 2002 5.25 3 4 2 3 3 2 5.07 17.51 1.64 2.9 
Ukraine 2003 9.52 3 4 2 4 3 2 8.11 18.10 2.84 3.2 
Ukraine 2004 12.11 3 4 2 4 3 2 15.15 16.72 2.65 3.2 
Ukraine 2005 3.00 3 4 2 4 3 3 24.19 17.36 9.07 3.3 
Ukraine 2006 7.44 3 4 2 4 4 3 14.73 17.55 5.21 3.6 
Ukraine 2007 7.59 3 4 2 4 4 3 23.10 17.03 7.15 3.6 
Ukraine 2008 2.30 3 4 2 4 4 3 28.58 16.98 5.95 3.6 
Ukraine 2009 -14.76 3 4 2 4 4 3 13.02 19.18 4.07 3.6 
Ukraine 2010 3.83 3 4 2 4 4 3 13.92 19.39 4.74 3.6 
Ukraine 2011 5.47 3 4 2 4 4 3 14.20 17.36 4.42 3.6 
Ukraine 2012 0.24 3 4 2 4 4 3 7.79 18.65 4.65 3.6 
Ukraine 2013 -0.03 3 4 2 4 4 3 4.34 18.58 2.46 3.6 
Ukraine 2014 -6.55 3 4 2 4 4 3 15.90 18.67 0.63 3.6 
Uzbekistan 1994 -5.20 2 3 1 3 2 1 1238.60 30.10 0.57 2.2 
Uzbekistan 1995 -0.90 3 3 2 3 2 2 370.94 32.01 -0.18 2.5 
Uzbekistan 1996 1.70 3 3 2 3 2 2 81.56 30.83 0.65 2.5 
Uzbekistan 1997 5.20 3 3 2 3 2 2 66.09 20.50 1.13 2.5 
Uzbekistan 1998 4.30 3 3 2 2 2 2 39.00 20.50 0.93 2.2 
Uzbekistan 1999 4.30 3 3 2 2 1 2 44.12 20.60 0.71 1.9 
Uzbekistan 2000 3.83 3 3 2 2 1 2 47.29 18.70 0.54 1.9 
Uzbekistan 2001 4.16 3 3 2 2 2 2 45.24 18.50 0.73 2.2 





Uzbekistan 2003 4.23 3 3 2 3 2 2 26.77 17.40 0.82 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2004 7.45 3 3 2 3 2 2 15.92 16.20 1.47 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2005 6.95 3 3 2 3 2 2 21.43 15.90 1.34 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2006 7.45 3 3 2 3 2 2 23.47 15.30 1.00 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2007 9.47 3 3 2 3 2 2 21.90 15.61 3.16 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2008 9.03 3 3 2 3 2 2 26.79 15.93 2.41 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2009 8.05 3 3 2 3 2 2 17.26 15.47 2.50 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2010 7.60 3 3 2 3 2 2 39.37 13.33 3.51 2.5 
Uzbekistan 2011 7.78 3 3 2 3 2 1 21.48 12.74 2.89 2.4 
Uzbekistan 2012 7.38 3 3 2 3 2 1 15.51 13.12 0.88 2.4 
Uzbekistan 2013 7.58 3 3 2 3 2 1 11.74 14.13 0.92 2.4 
Uzbekistan 2014 7.18 3 3 2 3 2 1 14.35 13.97 1.05 2.4 
 
